Summary
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a certified conflict concerning whether knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer is an essential element of resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes. The court held that knowledge of the officer's status is an element the State must prove, quashed the Third District's decision, and approved the Fifth District's contrary decision to that extent.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer is an essential element of resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2002).
- Whether the trial court's failure to give a requested instruction requiring the State to prove the defendant's knowledge of the officer's status was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether lack of knowledge of the victim's officer status may be treated as an affirmative defense rather than as an element the State must prove.
Holdings
- Knowledge that the person being resisted, obstructed, or opposed is a law enforcement officer is an essential element of resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes. The State bears the burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The failure to give the requested special instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence permitted the jury to find that Polite did not know Munoz was a police officer, and the prosecution affirmatively argued that the State was not required to prove that fact.
- Lack of knowledge that the person being resisted was an officer is not merely an affirmative defense; knowledge is an element of the offense that the State must prove.
Key quotations
“Because we conclude that knowledge is an essential element of the crime of resisting an officer with violence, we quash the Third District's decision in Polite and approve the Fifth District's decision in A.F., to the extent it held that the State has the burden of proving the defendant's knowledge of the officer's status.” (973 So. 2d at 1108)
“Rather, for all the aforementioned reasons, knowledge of the officer's status is an essential element that is part of the State's burden of proof.” (973 So. 2d at 1117)
“Thus, we cannot conclude that this error in failing to properly instruct the jury is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (973 So. 2d at 1118)
Factual background
Officer Marcos Munoz, working undercover, attempted to arrest Polite after observing him apparently tampering with a parking meter. Munoz displayed his badge and identified himself as a police officer, but Polite pulled away, escaped Munoz's grasp, attempted to hit him, and fled. When a uniformed officer later detained Polite, Polite submitted without a struggle and stated that he was not sure Munoz was a policeman. The jury convicted Polite of resisting an officer with violence after receiving an instruction that did not expressly require proof that Polite knew Munoz was an officer.
Procedural history
Polite was convicted in the trial court of misdemeanor tampering with a parking meter and felony resisting an officer with violence. The trial court denied his motions for judgment of acquittal, a requested special jury instruction, a mistrial, and a new trial. The Third District affirmed and held that knowledge of the officer's status was not an element, while certifying conflict with the Fifth District. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Third District's decision, approved A.F. to the relevant extent, and remanded for vacation of the resisting conviction and a new trial.
Remand instructions
Quash the Third District's decision, approve the Fifth District's decision in A.F. to the extent it held that knowledge of the officer's status is an essential element, vacate Polite's conviction for resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, and grant a new trial consistent with the opinion.