Summary
The Florida Supreme Court held that the identity and authority of the person who warns a defendant to leave school grounds are essential elements of trespass under section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes. The State therefore must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the warning was issued by the school principal or an authorized designee. Because the State presented no evidence that the security guard was authorized to restrict access, the court quashed the Third District's decision and vacated the juvenile's conviction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009), requires the State to prove the identity of the person who warned the defendant to leave school property.
- Whether the State must prove that the person who issued the warning was the school's principal or a person expressly or impliedly authorized by the principal to restrict access to the property.
- Whether D.J.'s conviction could stand despite the State's failure to present evidence of the security guard's identity and authority.
Holdings
- The identity and authority of the person who warned a defendant to leave school grounds are essential elements of the offense. The State must prove that the defendant was warned by a specific person and that the person was either the school's principal or a designee who received express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school property.
- The conviction could not stand because the State presented no competent, substantial evidence that the security guard was the principal or an authorized designee of the principal.
- Downer does not govern prosecutions under the current language of section 810.097(2) because the statute in Downer did not expressly require that the warning be issued by the property owner or an authorized person.
Key quotations
“Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property.” (1033)
“As in Dye, we find that the identity and authority of the person who has warned the defendant to leave the grounds of the school are essential elements of the trespass offense, which must be stated in the charging document and proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.” (1035)
Factual background
D.J., a juvenile who was not a student at Charles Drew Middle School, was encountered on the school's grounds by a security guard on January 12, 2009. The security guard told him to leave, and she saw him on the school grounds again the next day before notifying a school police officer, who arrested him for trespassing. The State presented no evidence that the security guard was the principal or an authorized designee of the principal, and the trial court expressly found that no such authority had been shown.
Procedural history
A delinquency petition was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleging that D.J. violated section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009). After a bench trial, the trial court denied D.J.'s motion for judgment of dismissal and adjudicated him delinquent. The Third District affirmed, concluding that the State did not need to prove the identity or authority of the person who warned D.J. to leave. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review based on conflict with State v. Dye and quashed the district court's decision.
Remand instructions
The decision of the Third District Court of Appeal was quashed, D.J.'s conviction was vacated, and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.