Davila v. State

75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011) · Supreme Court of Florida · October 6, 2011

Summary

The Florida Supreme Court held that section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping the parent’s own child. The Court concluded that the statute permits conviction when the parent forcibly, secretly, or by threat confines or imprisons the child with the requisite criminal intent. It approved the result reached by the Third District Court of Appeal and disapproved the Second District’s contrary decision in Muniz v. State.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Justice Labarga; Chief Justice Canady; Justice Lewis; Justice Pariente; Justice Perry; Justice Polston; Justice Quince
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
October 6, 2011
Procedural posture
Review of a certified-conflict decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concerning whether a parent may be convicted of kidnapping the parent's own child under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000).
Standard of review
De novo review applies to the interpretation of a statute because statutory interpretation is a purely legal matter.
Precedential value
Published Florida Supreme Court opinion; binding statewide precedent.
Parties
Ricardo Davila v. State of Florida
Disposition
approved

Topics

statutory interpretationplain meaning rulelegislative intentcriminal procedurefamily law

Practice areas

criminal lawstatutory interpretationfamily law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), permits a parent to be criminally convicted of kidnapping the parent's own child.
  2. Whether section 787.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), exempts a parent from criminal liability when the parent confines a child under thirteen without a court order depriving the parent of custody.

Holdings

  1. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping the parent's own child. A parent may be convicted when the State proves the statutory overt act and one of the specific intents required by the kidnapping statute.
  2. Section 787.01(1)(b) establishes a method of proving the involuntary nature of confinement of a child under thirteen; it does not eliminate the requirement that the State prove the defendant's forceful, secretive, or threatening overt act and the requisite kidnapping intent.

Key quotations

The unambiguous language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child. (at 196)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the plain language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not preclude a parent from being held criminally liable for kidnapping his or her own child. (at 197)

Factual background

Davila's eleven-year-old son arrived from Nicaragua and lived with Davila and his family in Florida. The child testified that Davila and his wife repeatedly confined him in a storage room and bathroom, including occasions when Davila locked him in a bathroom, blindfolded him, tied his hands and feet, placed a bucket over his head, gagged him, and struck or kicked him. The child eventually escaped and fled to a neighbor's home.

Procedural history

Davila was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including three counts of kidnapping his eleven-year-old son, and received concurrent sentences including life imprisonment for the kidnapping convictions. The Third District initially affirmed the convictions. In a later postconviction appeal, the Third District denied relief on the kidnapping issue but certified conflict with the Second District's decision in Muniz v. State. The Florida Supreme Court approved the result reached by the Third District, disapproved Muniz, and declined to address the other claims not raised before it.

Court Document

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