Summary
The Florida Supreme Court held that an outpatient physician owes a statutory duty to treat the patient in accordance with the applicable medical standard of care, even though Florida law does not impose on the physician a general duty to prevent an outpatient's suicide. The court held that the foreseeability of the specific suicide concerns proximate cause rather than duty and that a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court approved the Second District's decision and disapproved the First District's conflicting decision in Lawlor v. Orlando.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether an outpatient physician owes a general statutory medical-malpractice duty to treat the patient according to the prevailing professional standard of care even though Florida law does not impose on the physician a custodial duty to prevent the patient's suicide.
- Whether the foreseeability of the patient's specific injury, suicide, is a duty question for the court or a proximate-cause question for the jury.
- Whether summary judgment was proper where expert testimony and other evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicable standard of care and proximate cause.
Holdings
- Although Florida law does not impose a custodial duty on a physician to prevent an outpatient's suicide, the physician still owed the patient the statutory duty under section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, to treat her in accordance with the prevailing professional standard of care.
- The foreseeability of the patient's specific injury, including suicide, is generally relevant to proximate cause rather than to the determination of the physician's statutory duty of care.
- Summary judgment was improper because the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent's suicide was a foreseeable and proximate result of the physician's conduct.
- The court may rely on expert testimony to determine the applicable standard of care in a medical-malpractice action.
Key quotations
“Under duty, the question is “whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of harm to others.”” (199 So. 3d at 249)
“On the other hand, proximate cause asks “whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred.”” (199 So. 3d at 249)
“It is possible for a defendant to owe a legal duty of care to a specific plaintiff yet not be liable to that plaintiff because proximate causation cannot be proven.” (199 So. 3d at 254)
Factual background
Jacqueline Granicz had a history of depression and was treated by Dr. Joseph Chirillo, who changed her medication from Prozac to Effexor and later to Lexapro. After Jacqueline reported side effects, emotional distress, and that she had not felt right for months, Dr. Chirillo changed her medication and referred her to a gastroenterologist but did not require an office visit. Jacqueline committed suicide the following day. Her estate alleged that Dr. Chirillo breached the applicable medical standard of care and that the breach proximately caused the suicide.
Procedural history
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Dr. Chirillo had no legal duty to prevent the outpatient decedent's suicide. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the physician owed a general medical-malpractice duty to treat the patient according to the applicable standard of care and that proximate cause remained a jury question. The Second District certified conflict with Lawlor v. Orlando, and the Florida Supreme Court approved the Second District's decision and disapproved Lawlor.
Remand instructions
The Second District Court of Appeal's decision is approved, and the case is to proceed to trial in the trial court. The First District's decision in Lawlor v. Orlando is disapproved.