The Florida Bar v. Jon Douglas Parrish

241 So. 3d 66 (Fla. 2018) · Supreme Court of Florida · May 3, 2018 · No. SC15-1988

Summary

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a referee’s findings that attorney Jon Douglas Parrish violated multiple Rules Regulating the Florida Bar in connection with his representation of Spruce River Ventures, LLC, and its principal. The Court approved the findings and recommendations as to guilt, including violations involving prohibited business transactions, financial assistance to clients, competence, diligence, and acquiring an interest adverse to a client. It rejected the recommended one-year suspension and imposed a three-year suspension from the practice of law.

Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam; Chief Justice Labarga; Justice Pariente; Justice Lewis; Justice Quince; Justice Canady; Justice Polston; Justice Lawson
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
May 3, 2018
Docket number
SC15-1988
Procedural posture
Parrish sought review of a referee's report recommending findings of professional misconduct and a one-year suspension. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the referee's factual findings and recommendations as to guilt but increased the discipline to a three-year suspension.
Standard of review
The Court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for a referee's factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence. A referee's recommendation as to guilt is approved when the findings support the recommendation, and the party challenging the findings bears the burden of showing that the record contains no supporting evidence or clearly contradicts the conclusions. The Court's review of recommended discipline is broader because the Court bears ultimate responsibility for imposing the appropriate sanction.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida
Parties
Jon Douglas Parrish v. The Florida Bar
Disposition
other

Topics

commercial litigationreal estatecontractsmortgagesspecific performance

Practice areas

legal ethicsattorney disciplineprofessional responsibilityreal estate litigationcontracts

Questions Presented

  1. Whether competent, substantial evidence supported the referee's findings that Parrish violated the cited Bar Rules in connection with the Lamborghini fee agreement.
  2. Whether the referee's findings supported violations arising from Parrish's handling of the Cotton litigation, including failures of competence and diligence, improper business transactions, financial assistance to a client, and acquisition of a proprietary interest in the subject matter of litigation.
  3. Whether a mortgage obtained by a lawyer on property that was the subject of litigation constituted an impermissible proprietary interest under Bar Rule 4-1.8(i).
  4. Whether the referee's recommended one-year suspension was an appropriate sanction for Parrish's cumulative misconduct.

Holdings

  1. The Lamborghini agreement violated Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-1.5(a), and 4-1.8(a) because it was a nonordinary fee arrangement involving the client's property and did not satisfy the written disclosure, independent-counsel, and informed-consent requirements for a business transaction with a client.
  2. A lawyer who accepts primary responsibility for a client's representation cannot disclaim responsibility for an important litigation matter by assigning it to an associate; Parrish's failure to act timely on the death notice violated Bar Rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.3.
  3. The proposed settlement agreement violated Bar Rule 4-1.2(a) because it would have given Parrish co-equal decision-making authority with his client over litigation strategy rather than requiring Parrish to abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.
  4. Parrish violated Bar Rule 4-1.8(a) by entering into the mortgage and subordination transaction without the required written disclosures, opportunity for independent legal advice, and written client consent.
  5. Parrish violated Bar Rule 4-1.8(e) by loaning money to defendants to pay delinquent taxes on property involved in the client's litigation, because the rule prohibits financial assistance broadly and the loan subsidized litigation rather than advancing permissible litigation costs.
  6. A mortgage on property that is the subject matter of a client's litigation may constitute a proprietary interest prohibited by Bar Rule 4-1.8(i); the rule is not limited to ownership interests.
  7. A three-year suspension was warranted by Parrish's multiple, cumulative conflicts and related Bar Rule violations, rather than the referee's recommended one-year suspension.

Key quotations

The referee specifically found that the “forced sale” provision—i.e., the provision giving Parrish’s firm the right to sell the car and apply the proceeds of the sale to Bergaoui’s legal fees—triggered the requirements of the rule, which were not satisfied. (at 74)
Therefore, Parrish, as the primary lawyer, cannot simply disclaim responsibility for attending to what all agreed was an important issue in the case. (at 78)
We reject Parrish’s narrow reading of Bar Rule 4-1.8(i). Rather, we conclude that the rule is intended to prohibit a lawyer generally from acquiring other types of interests in the subject matter of the litigation; otherwise, the express exceptions for liens and contingency fees would be unnecessary. (at 84)
In addition, the Court views cumulative misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct, and cumulative misconduct of a similar nature warrants an even more severe discipline than might dissimilar conduct. (at 85)

Factual background

Parrish entered into an agreement to secure payment of legal fees with his client's Lamborghini without complying with the required disclosures and informed-consent requirements for business transactions with clients. In separate litigation involving a real-estate development contract, Parrish failed to respond timely to notice of a defendant's death, loaned money to opposing defendants to pay property taxes, obtained mortgages on parcels involved in the litigation, and pursued a proposed settlement that would have given his firm an ownership interest and Parrish co-equal control over litigation strategy. The referee found that these transactions created conflicts of interest, financial assistance to a client, an impermissible proprietary interest in the litigation, and failures of competence and diligence.

Procedural history

The Florida Bar filed a formal disciplinary complaint alleging misconduct in connection with Parrish's representation of a client in several matters. The referee found Parrish guilty of multiple rule violations in Counts I and III, dismissed or rejected other allegations, and recommended a one-year suspension. After the referee's report, the Supreme Court directed Parrish to show cause why a more severe sanction should not be imposed; following review, the Court affirmed the findings of guilt and imposed a three-year suspension.

Remand instructions

No remand. Parrish was suspended from the practice of law for three years, effective thirty days after filing unless he notified the Court that he was no longer practicing and did not need the thirty-day period. He was required to comply with Bar Rule 3-5.1(h), accept no new business from the filing date until reinstatement, and pay $7,100.38 in costs.

Court Document

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