Dr. Marc Bivins, et al. v. Charles W. Douglas, etc., et al.

Summary

The Third District held that a putative son lacked standing to contest a trust as an intestate heir because he failed to obtain a judicial declaration of paternity within the four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and the delayed discovery doctrine and equitable estoppel did not apply. His children also lacked standing because he was alive and in a superior class of descendants, and none of the appellants qualified as “interested persons” under section 731.201(23) since they were not named beneficiaries and could not inherit through intestacy.

Holdings

1. A trial court may consider an exhibit attached to or incorporated by reference into a complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment; the exhibit controls when its language is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations.
2. To establish standing as an intestate heir based on paternity, a party must obtain a judicial declaration of paternity within the four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(b); a mere allegation of paternity is insufficient.
3. Section 732.108(2)(a)'s provision allowing a person born out of wedlock to be considered a descendant if the parents participated in a marriage ceremony requires proof that the marriage was between the natural parents, which in turn requires a legal determination of paternity subject to the statute of limitations.
4. The delayed discovery doctrine under section 95.031, Florida Statutes, applies only to the causes of action specified in that statute; paternity actions are not among them, so the doctrine does not toll the limitations period for paternity.
5. Equitable estoppel does not bar the statute of limitations where the plaintiff was not aware of the facts giving rise to the claim during the limitations period; it presupposes the plaintiff knew of the facts but was induced to delay filing suit by the defendant's conduct.
6. Children of a living alleged descendant have no standing as intestate heirs where the descendant has not established paternity and would be in a superior class of descendants; further, they cannot challenge a trust when they are not named as beneficiaries and their interest has not vested.
7. To be an 'interested person' under section 731.201(23), one must have a reasonable expectation of being affected by the outcome; an individual whose interest is contingent upon invalidating a trust and inheriting through intestacy, but whose paternity claim is time-barred, does not have a vested interest and is not an interested person.
8. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when further amendments would be futile given prior opportunities to amend and repeated failure to cure deficiencies.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court erred in considering exhibits attached to the second amended complaint when ruling on the motion to dismiss.
2. Whether Appellants established standing to contest the trust instruments as intestate heirs or interested persons.
3. Whether the statute of limitations barred Bivins's paternity claim, and whether the delayed discovery doctrine or equitable estoppel applied.

Disposition

affirmed