Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's order setting aside two of three sentences for statutory rape, applying the *LaPan* rule that only one sentence may be imposed when multiple rape charges differ solely by the date alleged, as date is not an essential element of the crime. The state's argument that this rule should not apply to child sexual assault cases was rejected, as the victim in *LaPan* was also a child. The case also addresses the procedural posture: a motion to set aside a sentence may be treated as a petition for habeas corpus when the sentence is void.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the rule from LaPan v. State, that only one sentence can be imposed when multiple charges differ only in date and the date is not an essential element, should be applied in prosecutions for multiple sexual assaults against child victims.
Holdings
- The rule applies; the trial court did not err in applying it because the victim in LaPan was also a child.
Key quotations
“The trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for each of the three convictions of rape. The three charges differed from one another only with respect to the averment of date, and in none of the three was the date made an essential element. Since all the dates alleged fall within the period of the statute of limitation, only one sentence can be imposed.” (830)
“The victim of sexual assault in LaPan, supra, was also a child, and the trial court did not err in applying its rule in this case.” (830)
Factual background
McCrary was convicted of three counts of statutory rape. The charges differed only in the alleged date of the offense, and none made the date an essential element. The trial court granted McCrary's motion to set aside two of the three sentences, relying on LaPan v. State, which held that only one sentence can be imposed when multiple charges differ only in date and the date is not an essential element.
Procedural history
The trial court granted McCrary's motion to set aside two of three sentences for statutory rape convictions, relying on LaPan v. State. The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court, deeming it in the nature of a habeas corpus petition.