Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that hearsay evidence may be admitted in a parole revocation hearing and is not automatically without probative value. The court further held that the parolee’s due process right to confrontation was not violated because he did not invoke that right or object to the hearsay, and independent evidence supported two other parole violations. The habeas court’s judgment vacating the parole revocation was reversed.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether hearsay may be admitted and considered in a parole revocation hearing.
- Whether admission of the parole officer's hearsay testimony violated Lawrence's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
- Whether admission of the hearsay violated Lawrence's due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
- Whether the Board's findings of two additional parole violations independently supported revocation.
Holdings
- The Parole Board may admit hearsay evidence in a parole revocation hearing, and admitted hearsay may have probative value in that administrative proceeding.
- A parolee has no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation at a parole revocation hearing.
- Due process provides a less stringent confrontation right at a parole revocation hearing, and a parolee must specifically invoke that right or object to the hearsay before the tribunal must consider whether good cause justified denying confrontation.
- The Board's findings that Lawrence absconded from parole supervision and failed to pay the victim-compensation fee independently required reversal of the habeas court's order vacating the parole revocation.
Key quotations
“Therefore, we conclude that "[t]he Parole Board may admit hearsay. [Cit.]"” (273 Ga. at 297)
“Although the habeas court referred to the "constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses," Lawrence clearly has no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.” (273 Ga. at 297)
“Under the circumstances in this case, there is no violation of the due process right of confrontation.” (273 Ga. at 298)
Factual background
After his murder conviction was reversed, Charles Lawrence pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a twenty-year sentence. The Board of Pardons and Paroles granted him parole in 1988, but later conducted a revocation hearing based on allegations that he committed aggravated assault, absconded from supervision, and failed to pay a victim-compensation fee. The Board relied on a parole officer's hearsay account of statements by Lawrence's wife and daughter concerning the aggravated-assault allegation, while nonhearsay evidence supported the other two violations.
Procedural history
Lawrence's murder conviction was previously reversed. On remand, he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a twenty-year sentence, after which the Board of Pardons and Paroles granted parole. The Board later revoked parole based on three violations. Lawrence sought habeas relief, and the habeas court vacated the revocation based on the admission of hearsay concerning an alleged aggravated assault. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed.