Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the scope of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under Georgia's long-arm statute, OCGA § 9-10-91. The court reaffirmed that subsections (2) and (3) require the statutory acts and limitations stated in the statute, while holding that subsection (1), concerning transacting business in Georgia, must be construed broadly to the maximum extent permitted by constitutional due process. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further consideration of jurisdiction under subsection (1).
Holdings
- Subsection (2) applies when a nonresident commits a tortious act or omission within Georgia, subject to constitutional due process; subsection (3) applies when a nonresident commits a tortious injury in Georgia caused by an act or omission outside Georgia, but only if the statutory regular, persistent, or substantial-contact conditions are satisfied.
- OCGA § 9-10-91(1) authorizes Georgia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business in Georgia, without a statutory requirement of physical presence, a contract claim, or diminished significance for intangible contacts, subject only to the maximum reach permitted by constitutional procedural due process.
- The Court of Appeals' limited review of personal jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-10-91(1) was no longer appropriate; the subsection (1) issue had to be reconsidered under the broader construction announced by the Supreme Court.
Questions Presented
- Whether OCGA § 9-10-91(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose tortious act or omission occurred outside Georgia but whose injury occurred in Georgia.
- Whether OCGA § 9-10-91(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose out-of-state act caused a tortious injury in Georgia absent regular or persistent Georgia contacts or substantial revenue from Georgia.
- Whether OCGA § 9-10-91(1)'s authorization for jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts any business in Georgia is limited by a physical-presence requirement, a contract-claim limitation, or other judicially created restrictions.
- Whether the bank's contacts and conduct required further consideration of personal jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-10-91(1).
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (17)
- First National Bank of Ames, Iowa v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, LLC, 266 Ga. App. 842, 598 S.E.2d 530 (2004)(followed in part and vacated in part)
- Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987)(followed)
- Clarkson Power Flow v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979)(superseded)
- Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976)(superseded)
- Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1972)(limited)
- First United Bank of Miss. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 505, 340 S.E.2d 597 (1986)(superseded)
- Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004)(followed)
- Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981)(followed)
- Phears v. Doyne, 220 Ga. App. 550, 470 S.E.2d 236 (1996)(cited)
- Whitaker v. Krestmark of Alabama, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 536, 278 S.E.2d 116 (1981)(rejected)
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