State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511

630 S.E.2d 377 (2006) · Supreme Court of Georgia · May 17, 2006 · No. No. S05G1928

Summary

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that an equal-access jury instruction was not warranted in Johnson's trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Because the trial court did not instruct the jury on a presumption of possession and the vehicle ownership was not the sole evidence of possession, the court reversed the Court of Appeals.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Hines, Justice; Benham, Justice; All other Justices of the Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
May 17, 2006
Docket number
No. S05G1928
Procedural posture
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted the State's petition for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' reversal of Johnson's conviction-related proceedings based on the trial court's refusal to give an equal-access jury instruction.
Standard of review
Whether a requested jury charge was warranted is reviewed under the requirement that the charge be a legal, apt, and precise statement of a principle involved in the case and authorized by the evidence; a requested charge must also be pertinent and material and not substantially covered by the charge given.
Precedential value
binding
Parties
State v. Johnson
Disposition
reversed

Topics

jury instructionsstandard jury instructionsinstructions objectionscriminal procedureevidence

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurejury instructionscontrolled substances

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to give Johnson's requested jury instruction on the equal-access doctrine.
  2. Whether an equal-access instruction is warranted when the jury is not instructed on a presumption of possession arising from ownership or exclusive control of a vehicle.
  3. Whether the evidence supported an equal-access instruction when vehicle ownership was not the sole evidence of possession.

Holdings

  1. An equal-access instruction is appropriate to counter a jury instruction on a presumption of possession and is not necessary when no such presumption was placed before the jury.
  2. The equal-access instruction was not warranted because ownership of Johnson's vehicle was not the sole evidence supporting possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
  3. A requested jury charge must be given only when it is a correct statement of law, pertinent and material to an issue in the case, authorized by the evidence, and not substantially covered by the charge actually given.

Key quotations

The Wilkerson quote accurately reflects the law; a charge on equal access is appropriate to counter a jury instruction on presumption of possession, and is not necessary otherwise. (630 S.E.2d at 378)
Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. (630 S.E.2d at 378)
A requested jury charge must be "legal, apt and precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case and be authorized by the evidence." (630 S.E.2d at 379)

Factual background

Police searched Johnson's vehicle pursuant to a warrant and found twelve grams of crack cocaine in the ceiling console between the front seats. Johnson denied ownership and claimed that another person had accessed the unattended, unlocked vehicle and planted the drugs. The State also presented evidence that Johnson possessed $997 in cash, an amount consistent with crack-cocaine distribution, and that the vehicle was connected to a residence associated with other crack-cocaine arrests.

Procedural history

Johnson was tried for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after crack cocaine was found in the ceiling console of his vehicle. The trial court refused his requested equal-access instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the instruction should have been given. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals.

Court Document

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