Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that a violation of a Uniform Rule of the Road may constitute a "crime" or qualifying act under OCGA § 9-3-99 for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations on a related tort claim. The court concluded that no factual determination of criminal intent or criminal negligence was required to apply the tolling provision to the plaintiff's personal injury action. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Holdings
- A crime within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-99 need not satisfy the definition in OCGA § 16-2-1(a); the statute does not require proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence before its tolling provision applies.
- The violation of the Uniform Rule of the Road for following too closely was sufficient to bring OCGA § 9-3-99 into play, and no jury determination was required regarding whether Beneke acted with criminal intent or criminal negligence.
Questions Presented
- Whether the term "crime" in OCGA § 9-3-99 requires an offense involving criminal intent or criminal negligence as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1(a).
- Whether a violation of a Uniform Rule of the Road may toll the statute of limitation for a tort action under OCGA § 9-3-99.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (2)
- Slakman v. Continental Casualty Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003)(followed)
- Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008)(partially reversed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
Open PDFLoading document…