Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744

683 S.E.2d 586 (2009) · Supreme Court of Georgia · September 28, 2009 · No. Nos. S09A0715, S09A0716

Summary

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the denial of Chester Lewis Adams's motions for out-of-time appeals from judgments entered on negotiated guilty pleas in two cases. The court held that the plea colloquy adequately addressed the privilege against self-incrimination and other required rights, and that the record established sufficient factual bases or otherwise did not demonstrate manifest injustice. The court affirmed both judgments.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Chief Justice Hunstein
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
September 28, 2009
Docket number
Nos. S09A0715, S09A0716
Procedural posture
Adams appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal from judgments entered on negotiated guilty pleas in two cases.
Standard of review
The Supreme Court examined the face of the record to determine whether the asserted errors were reviewable and meritorious; it applied a manifest-injustice analysis to the alleged violation of Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia
Parties
Chester Lewis Adams v. The State
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefcriminal procedureplea bargainingappellate procedurefifth amendment

Practice areas

criminal procedureappellate procedurepost-conviction reliefconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether an out-of-time appeal from a guilty-plea judgment may be granted when the alleged errors can be resolved adversely to the defendant from the face of the record.
  2. Whether the plea colloquy adequately advised Adams of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination under Boykin v. Alabama.
  3. Whether the plea was invalid because the colloquy did not separately advise Adams of a purported right to remain silent.
  4. Whether the plea hearing sufficiently explained the nature of the charges.
  5. Whether the lack of an express recitation of the sentencing range invalidated Adams's negotiated guilty pleas.
  6. Whether the record established an adequate factual basis for the pleas under Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9, including whether the indictment and other record materials established a factual basis for the second indictment.

Holdings

  1. An appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea lies only when the asserted errors can be resolved from facts appearing on the face of the record, and denial of an out-of-time appeal is proper when the record reveals no merit in the claimed errors.
  2. A guilty plea is not invalid for failure to use prescribed language when the record shows that the defendant was informed in a reasonably intelligible manner of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Telling Adams that he would not have to give evidence harmful to himself adequately conveyed that privilege.
  3. A guilty plea is not invalid merely because the defendant was not separately advised of a right to remain silent, because that right is not one of the enumerated rights that Boykin or Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8 requires to be explained during the plea colloquy.
  4. Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9 requires the trial court to make an on-the-record inquiry sufficient to satisfy it that a factual basis exists, but the requirement may be satisfied by the record when the court is aware of the facts; an indictment may supply sufficient information to establish a factual basis even when it is not read into the plea transcript.
  5. A defendant's otherwise voluntary negotiated guilty plea is not invalid merely because the sentencing range or information about consecutive or enhanced sentencing was not fully recited, when the defendant does not claim disadvantage or lack of awareness and receives the sentence for which he bargained.

Key quotations

nothing in Boykin requires [the State] during a guilty plea proceeding to use any precisely-defined language or `magic words.' (589)
To hold otherwise would be to elevate formalistic litany of constitutional rights over the substance of the dialogue between the trial court and the accused. (589)
In such an instance, the acceptance of a plea would be deemed a factual finding that there is an adequate factual basis for the plea. (590)

Factual background

Adams entered negotiated guilty pleas to charges in two indictments at one hearing on April 10, 1997. The first indictment included malice murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated sodomy; the second charged terroristic threats and simple battery. During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor explained Adams's trial rights, including that he would not have to give evidence harmful to himself, and Adams stated that he understood and was waiving those rights. The plea-hearing transcript contained a factual recitation for the first indictment but no factual recitation for the second; however, the second indictment described the conduct and Adams acknowledged understanding the charges and pleading guilty because he was guilty.

Procedural history

Adams pleaded guilty to the charges in two indictments at a single hearing in 1997 and received negotiated sentences. In 2008, he moved for an out-of-time appeal, arguing that the record established that his guilty pleas were invalid and that ineffective assistance caused his failure to file a timely appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in both consolidated appeals.

Court Document

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