Fox v. Fox

291 Ga. 492 (2012) · Supreme Court of Georgia · September 10, 2012

Summary

The Georgia Supreme Court held that the parties’ self-styled Premarital Agreement was a marriage contract made in contemplation of marriage under OCGA § 19-3-63. Because the agreement was attested by only one witness rather than the two witnesses required by the statute, it was invalid and unenforceable. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and declined to reach the parties’ other arguments.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Nahmias, Justice; Nahmias, J.; Melton, J.; Blackwell, J.
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
September 10, 2012
Procedural posture
Interlocutory appeal in a divorce action from an order holding that the parties' purported Premarital Agreement was a marriage contract subject to OCGA § 19-3-63 and unenforceable because it was attested by only one witness.
Standard of review
De novo review of the legal characterization and enforceability of the agreement.
Precedential value
published and precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia
Parties
Joanne Fox v. Lyle M. Fox
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

prenuptial agreementsmarriagedivorcestatutory interpretationcontracts

Practice areas

family lawcontracts

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the parties' purported Premarital Agreement was a marriage contract made in contemplation of marriage under OCGA § 19-3-63.
  2. Whether the agreement was invalid and unenforceable because it was attested by only one witness rather than at least two.
  3. Whether the agreement's references to compensation, divorce, and property transformed it into a contract made in contemplation of divorce rather than marriage.

Holdings

  1. The agreement, viewed as a whole and based on its substance rather than its title, was a marriage contract made in contemplation of marriage, not a prenuptial agreement made in anticipation of divorce.
  2. Because the agreement was a marriage contract in writing made in contemplation of marriage, OCGA § 19-3-63 required it to be attested by at least two witnesses.
  3. The provision promising monthly compensation after a failed marriage was not an alimony provision; it could instead be viewed as a liquidated-damages clause.

Key quotations

It is the substance of the parties’ agreement, not its title, that matters. (493)
Accordingly, the parties’ Premarital Agreement, viewed as a whole, is a “marriage contract . . . made in contemplation of marriage,” not a prenuptial agreement made in anticipation of divorce, and the trial court therefore correctly denied enforcement of the agreement due to noncompliance with the attestation requirement of OCGA § 19-3-63. (495)

Factual background

Joanne and Lyle Fox divorced after 25 years of marriage, with the divorce decree requiring Lyle to pay child support and alimony. Before remarrying in 2002, they signed without counsel a notarized nine-page document titled “Premarital Agreement,” but the notary was its only witness; the remarriage extinguished Lyle's prior support obligations. In a later divorce proceeding, Joanne sought enforcement of the document, which primarily addressed conduct and obligations during the marriage and did not expressly provide for alimony, post-divorce property division, or child custody.

Procedural history

After the wife sought to enforce the parties' nine-page Premarital Agreement in a second divorce action, the trial court ruled on June 10, 2011, that the agreement was a marriage contract made in contemplation of marriage and void for failure to satisfy the two-witness attestation requirement. The trial court granted a certificate of interlocutory review, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted the wife's interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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