Murphy v. Murphy

295 Ga. 376 (2014) · Supreme Court of Georgia · June 30, 2014 · No. S13G1651

Summary

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the dismissal of an appeal from an order denying a motion to recuse a judge in a child-custody modification action. The court held that the 2013 amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) applied retroactively as a procedural amendment, but concluded that the recusal order was not directly appealable even under the prior version of the statute. The court noted that interlocutory appeal procedures or an appeal following final judgment remained available for recusal rulings.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Hines, Presiding Justice
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
June 30, 2014
Docket number
S13G1651
Procedural posture
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Murphy's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal on a different rationale.
Standard of review
De novo review of statutory interpretation and appellate jurisdiction.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia
Parties
Nancy Murphy v. John Murphy
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

family law procedurechild custodyappellate procedurestatutory interpretationinterlocutory appeal

Practice areas

family lawappellate procedurestatutory interpretationcivil procedureconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the 2013 amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) applied retroactively to an appeal filed before the amendment's effective date.
  2. Whether the order denying Nancy Murphy's motion to recuse the assigned judge was directly appealable under the pre-amendment version of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11).

Holdings

  1. The 2013 amendment, which altered appellate procedure and affected only the method for obtaining review, was properly subject to retroactive application, but retroactivity generally governs future filings, proceedings, and judgments arising from prior occurrences rather than automatically controlling prior filings and proceedings.
  2. The order denying Nancy Murphy's motion to recuse was not directly appealable under the prior version of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) because that provision authorized direct appeals from orders in child-custody cases concerning which parent has custody, and a recusal ruling is not such an order.
  3. A party seeking review of a pretrial ruling on a recusal motion may seek an interlocutory appeal or appeal immediately after an adverse final judgment.

Key quotations

But, to apply a procedural statute retroactively generally does not mean that it applies with respect to prior filings, proceedings, and occurrences, but rather that the procedural change affects future court filings, proceedings, and judgments that arise from prior occurrences. (at 379)
Clearly, the recusal ruling is not such an order. Consequently, the dismissal of Ms. Murphy’s appeal was warranted. (at 382)

Factual background

Nancy and John Murphy divorced in 2006. In 2012, John filed an action to modify the child-custody provisions of the divorce decree. After the case was assigned to Judge A. Quillian Baldwin, Nancy sought his disqualification; the judge denied the motion, and Nancy attempted a direct appeal before the 2013 amendment narrowing direct appeals in child-custody cases.

Procedural history

After the parties' 2006 divorce, John Murphy filed a child-custody modification action in 2012. Nancy Murphy moved to disqualify the assigned judge; the motion was denied on June 7, 2012, and she filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2012. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, reasoning that a 2013 amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) applied retroactively and eliminated a direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals' retroactivity analysis was flawed but affirmed because the recusal order was not directly appealable under either the prior or amended statute.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…