Jordan v. Everson

302 Ga. 364 (2017) · Supreme Court of Georgia · October 16, 2017

Summary

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that an intervening act need not be wrongful or negligent to break the chain of causation in a wrongful-death case. The court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent it relied on that erroneous requirement, while leaving the remainder of the judgment undisturbed.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Per curiam
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
October 16, 2017
Procedural posture
Jordan sought review by certiorari of the Georgia Court of Appeals' affirmance of the denial of his motion for summary judgment in a wrongful-death action.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the Court of Appeals' legal determination concerning proximate causation de novo in the context of the denial of summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants.
Precedential value
Published, precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Parties
Brian Jordan v. The Eversons
Disposition
reversed

Topics

proximate causewrongful deathnegligencewrit of certiorariappellate procedure

Practice areas

tortswrongful deathmedical malpracticeappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether an independent intervening act must be wrongful or negligent in order to break the causal chain and relieve the original defendant of proximate-cause liability.
  2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly denied summary judgment based on its conclusion that a jury had to determine whether the intervening act of driving Ben to Durham was wrongful or negligent.

Holdings

  1. Georgia law does not require an intervening act to be wrongful or negligent to break the causal chain. The relevant inquiry is whether the concurrence of the intervening act could reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant or whether the act was triggered by the defendant's conduct.

Key quotations

But the better doctrine is believed to be that whether or not the intervening act of a third person will render the earlier act too remote depends simply upon whether the concurrence of such intervening act might reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant. (365)
That was incorrect, as there is no requirement in Georgia that an intervening act be “wrongful or negligent” to break the causal chain. (365)

Factual background

Ben Everson was taken to an emergency room after experiencing hallucinations and hearing voices. Dr. Jordan diagnosed him with obsessive-compulsive disorder and discharged him, after an appointment was arranged at a nearby mental-health facility. Ben's father instead arranged an appointment at Duke University Hospital and drove Ben toward Durham; during the drive, Ben removed his seat belt, jumped from the moving vehicle, ran onto the highway, and was struck and killed by another vehicle.

Procedural history

Following Ben Everson's death, his parents sued emergency-room physician Brian Jordan. The trial court denied Jordan's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' holding that an intervening act must be wrongful or negligent to break the causal chain, while declining to review the other aspects of the Court of Appeals' decision.

Remand instructions

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part to the extent it held that summary judgment was properly denied because the alleged intervening act was not wrongful or negligent. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed.

Court Document

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