Yarbrough v. State

814 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. 2018) · Supreme Court of Georgia · May 7, 2018

Summary

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Travis Yarbrough's plea in bar after the trial court declared a mistrial based on prosecutorial conduct during a witness's examination. The court held that retrial was not barred by double jeopardy because the prosecution did not intentionally goad Yarbrough into seeking a mistrial. The court also declined to decide whether the prosecutor's conduct independently warranted the mistrial.

Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Writing for the Court
Blackwell, Justice; All the Justices
Jurisdiction
Georgia
Decision date
May 7, 2018
Procedural posture
After the trial court declared a mistrial on Yarbrough's motion based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Yarbrough filed a plea in bar asserting that retrial was constitutionally barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the plea, and Yarbrough appealed.
Standard of review
The trial court's factual finding regarding prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial is reviewed for clear error. Under that standard, the finding will not be reversed if any evidence supports it, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Travis Yarbrough v. State
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

double jeopardyprosecutorial misconductcriminal procedureappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether double jeopardy barred retrial after the trial court declared a mistrial on the defendant's motion based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
  2. Whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial.

Holdings

  1. When a mistrial is granted on the defendant's motion, double jeopardy generally does not bar retrial unless the defendant proves that the prosecution intentionally goaded the defendant into moving for a mistrial.
  2. A trial court's factual finding about whether the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial is reviewed for clear error and must be upheld if any evidence supports it.

Key quotations

The key issue is not whether the prosecutor acted improperly, or even how egregious the misconduct was, but rather, what objective the prosecuting attorney was trying to achieve. (288)
Furthermore, to determine whether the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, a trial court must "make a finding of fact by inferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances." (288)

Factual background

A group of gunmen invaded an Atlanta residence, robbed the occupants, killed Aaron Holloway, and wounded Charles Pegues and others. Pegues identified photographs of Yarbrough and another alleged gunman, but at trial he initially refused to identify Yarbrough in the courtroom. After consulting with his supervisor, the prosecutor pointed toward Yarbrough and asked Pegues whether Yarbrough was the person depicted in the lineup; the defense objected, Pegues answered affirmatively, and the trial court declared a mistrial. The prosecutor testified that he was attempting to obtain a positive identification, while the trial court found that he had not acted in bad faith to provoke a mistrial.

Procedural history

Yarbrough was tried before a Fulton County jury for murder and related offenses. During the State's direct examination of an eyewitness, the prosecutor pointed toward Yarbrough while attempting to elicit an in-court identification; the trial court sustained an objection and declared a mistrial. The trial court later found that the prosecutor had not intentionally provoked the mistrial and denied Yarbrough's plea in bar. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

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