Summary
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Takson Krstoth’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The plea colloquy did not adequately establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, particularly the right to a jury trial, in light of Krstoth’s limited English proficiency and educational background. The court vacated the appellate and circuit court judgments and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Krstoth’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
- Whether the plea colloquy affirmatively established that Krstoth knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a jury trial.
- Whether the record established fair and just reasons for withdrawal of the plea under Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 32(d).
Holdings
- The plea colloquy did not establish an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of Krstoth’s constitutional right to a jury trial because it did not explain his participation in jury selection, the unanimity requirement, or the court’s role in deciding guilt if he waived a jury.
- The record did not establish a valid knowing, intelligent, and voluntary change of plea because the colloquy inadequately described the reasonable-doubt standard, speedy-trial right, available motions, and authority responsible for determining the minimum sentence before parole consideration.
- Krstoth presented fair and just reasons for withdrawing his plea because the record failed to establish that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, and the State did not demonstrate substantial prejudice from withdrawal.
Key quotations
“It is plain error for a trial judge to accept a defendant’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” (at 10)
“a “liberal approach is to be taken, and the motion should be granted if the defendant has presented a fair and just reason for his request and the State has not relied upon the guilty plea to its substantial prejudice.”” (at 11)
“Especially considering Krstoth’s education and limited English proficiency, this advisement regarding his right to jury trial was clearly deficient, and does not establish on the record an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his right to jury trial, as required by Solomon.” (at 14)
Factual background
Krstoth, who had a tenth-grade education and did not read or write English, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder with the assistance of appointed counsel and a court-appointed Chuukese interpreter. Before sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea, stating that he had been pressured and did not understand his rights or the plea proceedings. The plea colloquy included only limited explanations of the jury-trial right, the reasonable-doubt standard, speedy-trial right, bench-trial alternative, and the authority responsible for setting parole eligibility. The State did not argue that withdrawal would substantially prejudice it.
Procedural history
Krstoth pleaded guilty to second-degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement. Before sentencing, he sought to withdraw the plea, asserting that it was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because of pressure from counsel and an interpreter and because he did not understand the proceedings. The circuit court denied the motion and later entered judgment and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The ICA affirmed, and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court granted review, vacated the ICA judgment and circuit court judgment, and remanded.
Remand instructions
The ICA’s September 9, 2015 Judgment on Appeal and the circuit court’s August 1, 2014 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence were vacated. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.