State v. Deedy

State v. Deedy · Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi · December 14, 2017 · No. SCAP-15-0000440

Summary

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed orders denying Christopher Deedy’s motions to dismiss charges before a potential third trial arising from the fatal shooting of Kollin Elderts. The court held that the motions were not waived under Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 12 and rejected Deedy’s arguments based on double jeopardy, statutory restrictions on prosecution, the trial court’s inherent authority, and Supremacy Clause immunity.

Court
Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi
Writing for the Court
Richard W. Pollack, J.; Mark E. Recktenwald, C.J.; Sabrina S. McKenna, J.; Michael D. Wilson, J.
Jurisdiction
Hawaii
Decision date
December 14, 2017
Docket number
SCAP-15-0000440
Procedural posture
Interlocutory appeal from orders denying the defendant's motions to dismiss with prejudice before a proposed third trial on included offenses following a murder acquittal and hung jury on the included offenses.
Standard of review
Double-jeopardy issues and statutory-construction issues are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard. A Moriwake dismissal ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with deference to the trial court and reversal only upon a strong showing that it clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded applicable legal principles. Supremacy Clause immunity presents a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Christopher Deedy v. State of Hawaiʻi
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

double jeopardyappellate procedurecriminal procedureconstitutional lawstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawappellate procedurestatutory interpretation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the defendant forfeited or waived his dismissal claims by filing them after the second trial.
  2. Whether double-jeopardy principles barred a third trial because the State allegedly abandoned the included offenses during the first or second trial.
  3. Whether the trial court's failure to instruct the first jury on lesser included offenses constituted an acquittal for double-jeopardy purposes.
  4. Whether collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the defendant's alleged reckless state of mind.
  5. Whether HRS §§ 701-109(2), 701-110(1), or 701-111(1)(a) and (c) barred retrial.
  6. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion under State v. Moriwake by denying dismissal with prejudice after the mistrials.
  7. Whether the defendant was immune from Hawaiʻi prosecution under the federal Supremacy Clause because he was a federal agent.

Holdings

  1. HRPP Rule 12(b)(1)'s pretrial-motion requirement for defects in the institution of a prosecution does not apply to motions concerning a retrial because a retrial is a continuation of an already instituted prosecution, not a new institution of prosecution.
  2. The State's decision to focus primarily on second-degree murder did not constitute abandonment of reckless manslaughter or the assault offenses, and the Quitog abandonment doctrine did not bar retrial on those offenses.
  3. A trial court's decision not to submit lesser-included-offense instructions is not an acquittal for state or federal double-jeopardy purposes.
  4. Collateral estoppel did not bar retrial because neither the first trial's instruction ruling nor the second trial's deadlock determined that Deedy was not guilty of reckless manslaughter or the assault offenses.
  5. HRS §§ 701-109(2), 701-110(1), and 701-111(1)(a) and (c) did not bar retrial of the included offenses.
  6. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying dismissal with prejudice under State v. Moriwake after balancing the relevant factors and allowing a third trial on the unresolved included offenses.
  7. Deedy was not immune from Hawaiʻi prosecution under the Supremacy Clause.

Key quotations

A retrial is a continuation of a prosecution that was already instituted (7)
the concept of abandonment adopted by this court in Quitog does not apply (15)
a trial court’s decision resolving the issue of whether to give or withhold certain jury instructions is not a “resolution . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged” and, thus, does not constitute an acquittal. (23)
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Deedy’s motion to dismiss after “balancing the interest of the state against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court system.” (55)
Accordingly, Deedy is not immune from state prosecution under the Supremacy Clause. (60)

Factual background

During an altercation at a Waikīkī fast-food restaurant on November 5, 2011, Christopher Deedy fatally shot Kollin Elderts. Deedy was charged with second-degree murder and a firearm offense. After the first trial ended in a deadlocked jury and mistrial, the second jury acquitted Deedy of second-degree murder but deadlocked on reckless manslaughter and first- and second-degree assault, prompting the State to seek a third trial on those included offenses.

Procedural history

Deedy was indicted for second-degree murder and a firearm offense. The first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked, and the second trial resulted in an acquittal on second-degree murder but a deadlock on reckless manslaughter and first- and second-degree assault. The circuit court denied motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy, Hawaiʻi statutory provisions, State v. Moriwake, the Hawaiʻi Constitution, and Supremacy Clause immunity, and authorized an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including the proceedings necessary to conduct the permitted retrial.

Court Document

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