Summary
The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the denial of Shane Bishop's motion to suppress methamphetamine discovered during a search incident to his arrest. The court held that information relayed by known citizen-informants, including hearsay from carnival workers, provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop. It reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated Bishop's conviction, and remanded the case.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the information relayed by a known citizen-informant, including hearsay from two identifiable carnival workers, provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.
- Whether the chief had reasonable suspicion that Bishop was armed and dangerous sufficient to justify a Terry frisk.
- Whether Bishop's peaceful refusal to submit to an unlawful frisk violated Idaho Code section 18-705 and supplied probable cause for his arrest.
- Whether methamphetamine discovered during the search incident to that arrest was admissible.
Holdings
- A tip relayed by a known citizen-informant may establish reasonable suspicion even when based on hearsay or double hearsay. Under the totality of the circumstances, the tip concerning Bishop provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.
- The frisk was unconstitutional because the officer lacked specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable conclusion that Bishop was armed and presently dangerous.
- Bishop's peaceful refusal to submit to the unlawful frisk did not violate Idaho Code section 18-705, so the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for resisting or obstructing.
- The methamphetamine discovered during the search incident to Bishop's unlawful arrest should have been suppressed.
Key quotations
“Because reasonable suspicion is determined based on the totality of the circumstances, including an informant's basis of knowledge, the fact that a tip is based on hearsay information is only a factor to consider in determining whether a stop was justified—it is not an absolute bar to a finding of reasonable suspicion.” (203 P.3d at 1212)
“Based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not conclude that Bishop posed a risk of danger and, therefore, Miller's frisk of Bishop was unlawful.” (203 P.3d at 1220)
“Accordingly, Miller did not have probable cause to arrest Bishop for obstructing an officer, the arrest was unlawful, and the evidence obtained during a search incident to that arrest should have been excluded.” (203 P.3d at 1220)
Factual background
A city superintendent reported to the police chief that two carnival workers had personally observed Bishop attempt to sell them methamphetamine and provided a description and location. The chief stopped Bishop, observed dilated pupils, bloodshot eyes, nervousness, and a grocery bag held close to his chest, and attempted to frisk him for weapons. Bishop twice said no; after the chief began the frisk, Bishop turned around, was arrested for resisting or obstructing, and struggled only when the officer attempted to handcuff him. A search incident to the arrest revealed methamphetamine in Bishop's pocket.
Procedural history
After police found methamphetamine in Bishop's pocket during a search incident to his arrest for resisting or obstructing an officer, Bishop moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion, and Bishop entered conditional guilty pleas to felony possession of a controlled substance and resisting an officer. The Court of Appeals held the frisk unconstitutional, vacated the conviction, and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the suppression ruling, vacated the conviction, and remanded.
Remand instructions
Reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion.