Summary
This Illinois Appellate Court opinion addresses a defendant's postconviction petition challenging his mandatory natural life sentence for double murder under the state constitution's proportionate-penalties clause. The court held that the defendant forfeited his claim by failing to raise it at trial or on direct appeal, noting that the narrow exception for Miller v. Alabama claims does not apply to proportionate-penalties challenges. Furthermore, the court concluded that a life sentence for a legal adult and principal shooter in a premeditated double murder does not shock the moral sense or violate constitutional standards.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Hewitt's failure to raise an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge at sentencing and on direct appeal forfeited the claim in his initial postconviction petition.
- Whether a Miller-inspired as-applied challenge under the Illinois proportionate-penalties clause falls within the narrow forfeiture exception for true Miller claims.
- Whether Hewitt's mandatory natural-life sentence was arguably unconstitutional under the Illinois proportionate-penalties clause despite his age, alleged mental illness, and developmental characteristics.
- Whether the circuit court's erroneous treatment of the filing as a successive petition required remand or permitted the appellate court to apply the correct first-stage standard itself.
Holdings
- Hewitt forfeited his as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge by failing to raise it at sentencing and by failing to raise it on direct appeal through plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The narrow forfeiture exception for an as-applied Miller claim did not apply because Hewitt was 19, his claim arose under the Illinois proportionate-penalties clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, and the claim was not a true Miller claim.
- Even if not forfeited, Hewitt's mandatory natural-life sentence for a premeditated double murder committed by a legal adult who was the principal and sole shooter was not arguably unconstitutional under the proportionate-penalties clause.
- Remand was unnecessary; the appellate court could apply the correct first-stage standard to the initial petition and independently affirm summary dismissal.
Key quotations
“It does not fall within the “very narrow exception” to forfeiture for true Miller claims. So it can be forfeited, just like any other claim, constitutional or otherwise.” (¶ 51)
“Simply put, after Miller, a young adult’s proportionate-penalties claim is the same as it has always been.” (¶ 95)
“Petitioner’s claim is forfeited, and in any event, a life sentence for a premeditated double murder committed by a legal adult is not arguably unconstitutional.” (¶ 100)
Factual background
Hewitt was 19 when he planned and carried out a shooting at a basketball court used by rival gang members. He dressed in rival-gang colors, gained access to the group, and opened fire, killing two people and injuring a third. The evidence showed that he was the principal and sole shooter, acted after weeks of revenge planning, and had significant criminal and disciplinary histories. The sentencing record also included contested evidence of mental illness, cognitive limitations, adverse childhood experiences, impulsivity, and possible rehabilitative potential.
Procedural history
Hewitt was convicted of two murders and attempted murder and received mandatory natural life plus a consecutive 30-year term. His convictions and sentence were not challenged on direct appeal. In 2023, he filed a petition labeled as a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, but the State conceded it was actually an initial petition. The circuit court treated it as successive, denied leave under the cause-and-prejudice standard, and alternatively found that Hewitt had not shown prejudice and that his claim failed on the merits. The appellate court held that the circuit court applied the wrong procedural standard, conducted de novo review under the first-stage standard, and affirmed summary dismissal on forfeiture and alternative merits grounds.