Summary
The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed Daniel T. Webster Jr.'s conviction for violating a plenary stalking/no-contact order. The court held that public social-media posts directed to the protected person may constitute prohibited indirect contact under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, even when the victim is not named, does not follow the account, and discovers the posts through monitoring. The court also rejected the defendant's First Amendment challenge to applying the no-contact provision to his posts.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Webster's public social-media posts constituted prohibited indirect contact with H.B. under the Stalking No Contact Order Act.
- Whether applying the no-contact order to Webster's social-media posts violated the First Amendment as an impermissible content-based restriction on speech.
Holdings
- Public social-media posts constitute prohibited indirect contact under a stalking/no-contact order when they are directed to the protected victim and are posted without the victim's consent or in disregard of the victim's expressed desire to avoid contact, even if the victim does not follow the account, is not tagged or named, and discovers the posts through monitoring or third parties.
- The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Webster knowingly violated the stalking/no-contact order.
- The no-contact order was a content-neutral restriction on communication with the protected victim, not an impermissible content-based restriction on speech; therefore, the court rejected Webster's First Amendment challenge.
Key quotations
““ ‘Contact’ includes any contact with the victim, that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; electronic communication as defined in Section 26.5-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and appearing at the prohibited workplace, school, or place of worship.”” (¶ 19)
“Thus, we decline to hold that a stalking victim forfeits the protections of a no-contact order by monitoring a stalker’s social media accounts.” (¶ 29)
“In prohibiting communication with [H.B.], the SNCO drew no distinctions based on the substance of the communication and was, therefore, content neutral.” (¶ 34)
Factual background
Daniel T. Webster Jr. was subject to a plenary stalking/no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting H.B. directly, indirectly, or through third parties. While the order was in effect, Webster posted publicly available social-media messages referring to H.B., including second-person messages, references to the order and its expiration, a photograph of H.B.'s car, and statements the court found were intended to convey that she should fear him. A jury found Webster guilty of violating the order, and the trial court imposed jail, probation, and GPS monitoring.
Procedural history
Defendant was charged by complaint with violating a plenary stalking/no-contact order. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to three weekends in jail, 18 months of probation, and 18 months of GPS monitoring. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed.