Summary
The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed summary judgment for staffing agencies in a putative class action alleging violations of section 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. The court held that the agencies’ enrollment, instruction, and monitoring of employees’ use of biometric time clocks did not constitute collecting, capturing, or obtaining biometric data because they did not possess, access, or control the data. The court also affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery before summary judgment.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Staffing Agencies' enrollment, instruction, monitoring, and implementation of biometric time clocks constituted collecting, capturing, purchasing, receiving, or otherwise obtaining biometric information under section 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.
- Whether the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Staffing Agencies on the section 15(b) claims.
- Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' request for discovery before ruling on summary judgment.
Holdings
- Section 15(b) regulates a defendant's acquisition of biometric data; conduct that merely facilitates another entity's collection of the data, without the defendant possessing, accessing, or controlling it, is insufficient to establish liability.
- Summary judgment was proper because plaintiffs failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Staffing Agencies collected or obtained biometric data.
- The circuit court acted within its discretion in denying additional discovery because the requested discovery concerned implementation or required use of the time clocks, not the dispositive issue of whether the Staffing Agencies directly accessed or controlled the biometric data.
Key quotations
“Each operative verb in section 15(b) presupposes that a defendant acquires the biometric data, not merely that its conduct facilitates another entity’s acquisition. In other words, section 15(b) regulates acquisition of biometric data; not proximity to it.” (¶ 20)
“The Staffing Agencies’ conduct in requiring or implementing the use of the biometric time clocks, when the data was collected by a different entity, is insufficient to trigger section 15(b) liability in this case, based on the statutory language.” (¶ 21)
“While the Biometric Information Privacy Act is a statute that wields the impact of a grenade, it does not impose liability on everyone who happens to be standing nearby.” (¶ 31)
Factual background
Plaintiffs worked at a food manufacturing facility operated by Arthur Schuman Cheese, LLC, where biometric time clocks leased from Paycom Payroll, LLC were used to track workers' hours. Surestaff and Metrostaff placed the plaintiffs at the facility and enrolled them in the time-clock system, instructed them in its use, and monitored their time records. The Staffing Agencies submitted unrebutted affidavits stating that Schuman required use of the clocks, retained exclusive possession and control of the biometric data, and gave the agencies only limited administrative access to enroll workers and correct non-biometric time records.
Procedural history
Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that staffing agencies collected their fingerprints through biometric time clocks without the notice and written consent required by section 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. The circuit court denied plaintiffs' request for discovery under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(b), then granted summary judgment to the Staffing Agencies after finding that they did not possess, access, or control the biometric data. The court later entered a Rule 304(a) finding, and plaintiffs appealed; claims against Schuman remained pending.