In re Adoption of L.T.M.

Summary

The Illinois Supreme Court held that an indigent parent in a private adoption proceeding is constitutionally entitled to a record sufficient for appellate review and to appointed counsel. The court reinstated the parent’s appeal but affirmed the finding of unfitness and the judgment of adoption. It also affirmed the order requiring Franklin County to pay appointed counsel’s reasonable fees and costs.

Holdings

1. When Illinois provides an appeal as of right from an order terminating parental rights in a private adoption, the federal Constitution requires the State, upon a showing of indigency, to provide the parent with a record sufficient to permit proper appellate review.
2. The appellate court erred by dismissing John's appeal for want of prosecution because his failure to file the record resulted from the court's erroneous denial of his request for a free record.
3. The circuit court's finding that John was unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for L.T.M.'s welfare was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
4. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires Illinois to provide appointed counsel to indigent parents who face loss of parental rights in proceedings under the Adoption Act.
5. Because appointment of counsel was constitutionally mandated, the order requiring Franklin County to pay appointed counsel's reasonable fees and costs did not violate separation of powers.

Questions Presented

1. Whether an indigent parent appealing as of right from a private adoption judgment terminating parental rights is constitutionally entitled to a record sufficient for appellate review.
2. Whether the appellate court properly dismissed John's appeal for failure to file the record when the court had denied his request for a free record.
3. Whether the circuit court's finding that John was unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
4. Whether the statutory distinction between indigent parents facing termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act and those facing termination under the Adoption Act violated equal protection.
5. Whether an order requiring Franklin County to pay reasonable fees and costs for constitutionally mandated appointed counsel violated separation of powers.

Disposition

other