Summary
The Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether indictments charging former township supervisor Robert Grever with official misconduct sufficiently stated criminal offenses. The court held that the Township Code provision requiring reporting of unpaid township indebtedness did not require reporting accounts receivable owed to the township, and that other counts failed to identify an underlying law, rule, regulation, or professional-code provision allegedly violated. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, reversing the convictions challenged in the appeal.
Holdings
- Section 70-15(c)(v) required reporting unpaid indebtedness owed by the township, both current and not yet due, but did not require reporting accounts receivable or amounts owed to the township. Because counts IV, V, and VI were predicated solely on the alleged failure to report the mother-in-law's debt to the township, those counts did not charge an offense.
- An indictment under section 33-3(c) must at minimum allege facts showing that the defendant violated an identifiable statute, rule, regulation, or tenet of a professional code and explain how the defendant exceeded lawful authority. Counts VII and X were insufficient because they did not identify any underlying law and instead relied on an alleged uncodified fiduciary duty.
- They could not. Because counts IV, V, and VI themselves failed to state offenses, incorporating their allegations did not cure the failure of counts VII and X to identify an underlying law allegedly violated.
Questions Presented
- Whether section 70-15(c)(v) of the Township Code required a township supervisor to report amounts owed to the township, including accounts receivable, in the township's annual financial-affairs statement.
- Whether indictments charging official misconduct under section 33-3(c) were sufficient when they alleged that the defendant exceeded his lawful authority but did not identify a statute, rule, regulation, or professional-code provision that he violated.
- Whether allegations in counts IV, V, and VI could cure the deficiencies in counts VII and X when the indictment was read as a whole.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (20)
- People v. Lutz, 73 Ill. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978)(followed)
- People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005)(followed)
- People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003)(followed)
- Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000)(followed)
- People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002)(followed)
- Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 212 Ill. 2d 58, 816 N.E.2d 303 (2004)(followed)
- Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997)(followed)
- Guillen v. Potomac Insurance Co. of Illinois, 203 Ill. 2d 141, 785 N.E.2d 1 (2003)(followed)
- In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 656 N.E.2d 1049 (1995)(followed)
- Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207 Ill. 2d 409, 799 N.E.2d 260 (2003)(followed)
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