Summary
The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a claim for prenatal injuries caused by a physician’s allegedly mislabeled dietary supplement was subject to the medical statute of repose in 735 ILCS 5/13-212(b). The court held that the claim arose out of patient care and was therefore governed by that statute, but concluded that the plaintiff’s fetal status constituted a legal disability that tolled the repose period under section 13-212(c). The court reversed dismissal of the claim.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a claim alleging that a physician prescribed and sold a mislabeled dietary supplement that poisoned a patient and her fetus alleged an injury arising out of patient care under section 13-212(b).
- Whether the eight-year repose period in section 13-212(b) was tolled or delayed for a prenatal-injury claim until the injured child was born under section 13-212(c).
Holdings
- The phrase "arising out of patient care" requires a causal connection between the patient's medical care and the injury; it covers injuries originating in or incidental to the patient's medical care and treatment, even when the claim is framed as ordinary negligence or another theory rather than medical malpractice. The poisoning of Anna and her fetus arose out of patient care because Dr. Mercola diagnosed Anna, prescribed L-glutamine, and sold her a bottle intended to contain that supplement but filled with selenium.
- For a claim based on prenatal injury, the eight-year repose period under section 13-212(b) does not begin to run until the child is born and has a legally enforceable right to pursue the claim. Robert's count III claim, filed within eight years after his birth, was therefore timely.
Key quotations
“Considering the above authorities, we construe “arising out of patient care” simply as requiring a causal connection between the patient’s medical care and the injury.” (at 517)
“Nothing would seem more repugnant to basic notions of fundamental fairness than to hold that the clock is ticking on someone’s right to file suit during a period in which the law forbids that person from filing suit.” (at 537)
“Because Robert was a fetus at the time of the occurrence that led to his injury, however, the eight-year period did not begin to run until he was born and had a right to pursue his claim in court.” (at 539)
Factual background
Anna Brucker consulted Dr. Joseph Mercola during pregnancy, and he prescribed L-glutamine to treat a diagnosed medical condition. An employee mistakenly filled a bottle marked L-glutamine with selenium, which Dr. Mercola sold to Anna; she ingested it and became violently ill, allegedly injuring her fetus, Robert. Robert was born on January 5, 1996, and the plaintiffs later added a claim alleging that he had been poisoned in utero.
Procedural history
The Bruckers filed a medical malpractice action arising from Anna Brucker's ingestion of selenium mistakenly bottled and sold as L-glutamine during pregnancy. They later amended the complaint to add a claim on behalf of Robert Grant Brucker for prenatal injuries. The circuit court ultimately dismissed count III as untimely under section 13-212(b), and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed both judgments and remanded.
Remand instructions
The appellate court judgment and the circuit court judgment were reversed, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings; count III was not subject to dismissal as untimely.