Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516

901 N.E.2d 329 (2008) · Supreme Court of Illinois · October 17, 2008 · No. 104983

Summary

The Illinois Supreme Court reviews a products-liability action arising from the death of James Mikolajczyk after a rear-end collision involving a Ford Escort. The case concerns whether the jury was properly instructed on the consumer-expectation test versus the risk-utility test for defective design, as well as whether the damages award for loss of society was excessive.

Court
Supreme Court of Illinois
Writing for the Court
Justice Garman; Justice Freeman; Justice Thomas; Justice Karmeier; Justice Burke; Chief Justice Fitzgerald; Justice Kilbride
Jurisdiction
Illinois
Decision date
October 17, 2008
Docket number
104983
Procedural posture
Defendants appealed from a judgment entered after a jury trial in a strict products-liability design-defect action. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to decide whether the jury should have been instructed on the risk-utility test in addition to the consumer-expectation test and allowed plaintiff to seek cross-relief concerning excessive loss-of-society damages.
Standard of review
Questions concerning whether Illinois substantive law required or permitted a particular jury instruction were reviewed de novo. The trial court's decision to give or refuse a tendered jury instruction was reviewed for abuse of discretion, with reversal warranted where a legally correct, evidence-supported instruction was refused and the refusal prejudiced the requesting party's right to a fair trial.
Precedential value
published precedential Illinois Supreme Court opinion
Parties
Ford Motor Company, Mazda Motor Corporation v. Connie Mikolajczyk, individually and as special administrator of the estate of James Mikolajczyk, deceased
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

products liabilitypersonal injurydamagesappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

products liabilitypersonal injurywrongful deathappellate proceduredamages

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Illinois law makes the risk-utility test the sole and exclusive method of proving that a product is unreasonably dangerous because of a design defect.
  2. Whether Illinois law makes the risk-utility test the exclusive test for complex products or products used in circumstances unfamiliar to ordinary consumers.
  3. Whether the existence of a feasible alternative design and the balancing of risks and benefits are elements that a plaintiff must plead and prove in every Illinois strict-liability design-defect case.
  4. Whether defendants were entitled to a jury instruction on the risk-utility test when the evidence included expert testimony concerning alternative designs, feasibility, risks, and benefits, even though plaintiff proceeded under the consumer-expectation method of proof.
  5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and prejudiced defendants by refusing the tendered risk-utility instruction.
  6. Whether the loss-of-society damages award was excessive.

Holdings

  1. Both the consumer-expectation test and the risk-utility test remain available methods of proving that a product is unreasonably dangerous because of a design defect. The risk-utility test is not the sole measure of dangerousness in all strict-liability design-defect cases or in cases involving complex products.
  2. The existence of a feasible alternative design and the balancing of risks and benefits are relevant considerations in a strict-liability design-defect case, but they are not elements that the plaintiff must plead and prove in every case.
  3. A defendant may present evidence and request an instruction based on the risk-utility method of proof when the evidence supports that method, even if the plaintiff chose the consumer-expectation method.
  4. When the evidence supports application of the integrated risk-utility test, the jury must be instructed on that test if either party requests the instruction. The integrated test incorporates consumer expectations as one factor among the broader risk-and-utility factors.
  5. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing defendants' tendered risk-utility instruction, because the evidence sufficiently raised risk-utility issues and the refusal prejudiced defendants' right to a full and fair trial.

Key quotations

We adopt this formulation of the risk-utility test and hold that when the evidence presented by either or both parties supports the application of this integrated test, an appropriate instruction is to be given at the request of either party. (at 550)
In sum, we hold that both the consumer-expectation test and the risk-utility test continue to have their place in our law of strict product liability based on design defect. (at 551)
We, therefore, hold that the trial court’s refusal to give the tendered instruction was an abuse of discretion. (at 557)
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded. (at 559)

Factual background

James Mikolajczyk was driving a 1996 Ford Escort stopped at a red light when a Cadillac driven by William Timberlake, who had consumed two pints of gin and was traveling approximately 60 miles per hour, struck the Escort from behind. James suffered severe brain trauma after the Escort's driver seat collapsed and propelled him rearward, causing his head to strike the backseat; he later died. The evidence included competing expert testimony about the yielding CT20 seat design, alternative rigid-seat designs, feasibility, crash risks, federal safety compliance, and the comparative risks and benefits of different seat designs.

Procedural history

Plaintiff sued the other driver for negligence and Ford and Mazda for strict products liability based on the allegedly defective design of a Ford Escort driver's seat. Summary judgment was entered against the other driver. After a jury found Ford and Mazda liable and awarded $2 million for loss of money, goods, and services and $25 million for loss of society, the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the loss-of-society award excessive and remanding for a remittitur hearing. After remand in light of Calles, the appellate court again affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed both the appellate and circuit court judgments and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly refused defendants' risk-utility jury instruction.

Remand instructions

Reverse the appellate court judgment and the circuit court judgment and remand the cause to the Circuit Court of Cook County for a new trial using appropriate instructions addressing risk-utility analysis when supported by the pleadings and evidence. The court did not reach whether the loss-of-society award was excessive.

Court Document

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