People v. Brown

Summary

The Illinois Supreme Court considers whether a postconviction petitioner made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that counsel gave erroneous advice about the percentage of a negotiated guilty-plea sentence that he would be required to serve. The court holds that claims concerning counsel’s advice about the consequences of a guilty plea do not require the petitioner to allege actual innocence or a plausible trial defense, but a bare assertion that the defendant would have rejected the plea is insufficient. The court affirms the dismissal of Anthony S. Brown’s amended postconviction petition.

Holdings

1. Counsel's alleged advice that Brown would serve only 50% of his sentence, when the applicable statute required him to serve 85%, was objectively unreasonable and sufficiently alleged deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland.
2. A defendant alleging that plea counsel misadvised him about a consequence of pleading guilty need not allege actual innocence or a plausible trial defense to establish prejudice; those requirements apply to claims concerning trial strategy or prospects of acquittal, not to claims concerning the defendant's understanding of plea consequences.
3. A bare or conclusory allegation that the defendant would have rejected the guilty plea and gone to trial is insufficient to establish prejudice. The court must consider the surrounding circumstances and determine whether rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances.
4. Brown was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his amended petition did not make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Brown made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's allegedly erroneous advice concerning the percentage of his sentence he would have to serve.
2. Whether a guilty-plea defendant alleging erroneous advice about a consequence of the plea must allege actual innocence or a plausible defense to establish prejudice.
3. Whether Brown's allegations and supporting documents warranted a third-stage evidentiary hearing under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

Disposition

affirmed