Summary
The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether its decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt continued to bar common-law property claims between unmarried domestic partners. It held that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review several counterclaim counts under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), and that the claims were also moot because the underlying partition judgment had become final. The court vacated in part and reversed in part the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the circuit court's dismissal of counterclaim counts I, II, IV, and V was a final, appealable order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a).
- Whether the appeal concerning counts I, II, IV, and V was moot after the underlying partition judgment became final and the home was conveyed.
- Whether an Illinois appellate court may overrule or disregard a controlling Illinois Supreme Court precedent.
- Whether Hewitt v. Hewitt remains controlling and bars common-law property remedies based on a marriage-like relationship between knowingly unmarried cohabitants.
- Whether Brewer's constructive-trust and restitution claims concerning Blumenthal's medical-practice interest were independent of the parties' marriage-like relationship.
- Whether application of Hewitt violated federal or Illinois constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
Holdings
- The dismissal of counts I, II, IV, and V was not a final judgment or order appealable under Rule 304(a) because those counts merely presented alternative theories for dividing the value of the same home involved in the partition action.
- The claims concerning division of the Chicago home were moot because the partition judgment became final, neither party appealed, Brewer bought out Blumenthal's interest, and the property was subsequently conveyed.
- The appellate court lacked authority to repudiate or overrule Hewitt v. Hewitt; Illinois Supreme Court precedent binds all lower courts unless changed by the supreme court.
- Brewer could not obtain a constructive trust over Blumenthal's ownership interest in or proceeds from the medical practice because the Medical Corporation Act prohibits an unlicensed person from owning, managing, or controlling an interest in a medical corporation.
- Hewitt bars Brewer's restitution claim because the alleged contribution to Blumenthal's medical-practice interest arose from and was dependent on the parties' marriage-like relationship rather than having an independent economic basis.
- Applying Hewitt to bar Brewer's common-law property claims did not violate the federal or Illinois guarantees of due process or equal protection.
Key quotations
“The appellate court lacks authority to overrule decisions of this court, which are binding on all lower courts.” (¶ 28)
“Accordingly, this court held that Victoria’s claims were “unenforceable for the reason that they contravene the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”” (¶ 58)
“Our decision in Hewitt bars such relief if the claim is not independent from the parties’ living in a marriage-like relationship for the reason it contravenes the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Marriage and Dissolution Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.” (¶ 73)
“The judgment of the appellate court is therefore vacated in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court dismissing Brewer’s counterclaim in full is affirmed.” (¶ 89)
Factual background
Blumenthal and Brewer were same-sex domestic partners for approximately three decades, raised three children, and jointly owned a Chicago home. They commingled personal and financial assets, used joint funds in connection with Blumenthal's purchase of an ownership interest in a medical practice, and otherwise conducted their relationship in a manner they characterized as marriage-like. After the relationship ended, Blumenthal sought partition of the home, while Brewer counterclaimed for constructive-trust, equitable-division, quantum-meruit, and restitution remedies.
Procedural history
Blumenthal filed a partition action concerning the parties' jointly owned home. Brewer filed a five-count counterclaim seeking remedies concerning the home and Blumenthal's medical-practice interest. The circuit court dismissed the counterclaim under Hewitt v. Hewitt. The appellate court held that Hewitt was obsolete, vacated the dismissal, and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the appellate judgment in part, reversed it in part, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing the counterclaim in full.
Remand instructions
No substantive remand was ordered. The appellate court judgment was vacated in part and reversed in part, and the circuit court judgment dismissing Brewer's counterclaim in full was affirmed.