Summary
The Indiana Supreme Court held that trial courts lack statutory authority to impose partially consecutive, hybrid, or blended sentences for a single conviction. Bryant E. Wilson’s sentence, which split his armed-robbery sentence between concurrent and consecutive service, was therefore erroneous. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, limiting the aggregate sentence to no more than the original fifty-year term.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Indiana sentencing statutes authorize a trial court to split a single sentence so that part runs concurrently with other sentences and part runs consecutively.
- Whether Wilson was entitled to correction of his sentence and resentencing.
- Whether resentencing could exceed the original aggregate fifty-year sentence.
Holdings
- Absent specific authorization by the General Assembly, trial courts may not split a sentence for one conviction so that part is served concurrently with other sentences and part is served consecutively. Courts may impose some separate sentences concurrently and others consecutively, but may not divide a single conviction's sentence in that manner.
- Wilson's partially concurrent and partially consecutive sentence exceeded the trial court's statutory authority, making the sentence erroneous and entitling him to resentencing.
- On remand, the trial court could not impose an aggregate sentence exceeding the original fifty-year sentence.
Key quotations
“Because trial courts are limited to sentences authorized by statute, and because the relevant provisions of the Indiana Code here do not authorize such a hybrid sentence, the answer must be “no.”” (at 2)
“sentencing is a creature of the legislature and [] we are limited to sentences that have been expressly permitted by the legislature.” (at 3)
“the plain language of the statute contemplates only consecutive or concurrent terms, not a hybrid of both, for a sentence on one count.” (at 4)
“We therefore expressly hold that absent specific authorization by the General Assembly not found in the current statutory scheme, trial courts may not impose partially consecutive, hybrid, or blended sentences for multiple convictions.” (at 6)
Factual background
In 1995, a jury found Wilson guilty of rape and criminal deviate conduct, each as a Class A felony, and armed robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed forty-five years for each Class A felony and twenty years for armed robbery, ordering the Class A sentences concurrent while making fifteen years of the armed-robbery sentence concurrent and five years consecutive, producing a fifty-year aggregate sentence. Wilson later challenged the partially concurrent and partially consecutive structure as unauthorized by statute.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Wilson in 1995 of rape, criminal deviate conduct, and armed robbery. The trial court imposed an aggregate fifty-year sentence by ordering two sentences concurrently and splitting the armed-robbery sentence into fifteen years concurrent and five years consecutive. After pursuing direct appeal, post-conviction relief, habeas relief, and sentence modification, Wilson filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence in 2012. The trial court denied the motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and remanded for resentencing.
Remand instructions
Reverse the denial of Wilson's motion to correct erroneous sentence and resentence him for the rape, criminal deviate conduct, and armed robbery convictions. The trial court may not impose a hybrid sentence and may not exceed the original aggregate fifty-year sentence.