Summary
The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed Richard Moore’s death sentence following a resentencing hearing after post-conviction relief proceedings. The court rejected challenges concerning the right to a jury, the sufficiency of evidence that Moore knowingly killed a police officer, mitigation, prolonged death-row incarceration, lethal injection, and the exclusion of expert testimony regarding his awareness.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Moore's guilty pleas forfeited any right to a jury determination of the death-eligibility aggravating circumstances.
- Whether sufficient evidence supported the finding that Moore knowingly killed a law-enforcement officer acting in the course of duty.
- Whether the trial court improperly weighed or delegated consideration of mitigating evidence to the clemency process.
- Whether approximately twenty years on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the federal or Indiana Constitution.
- Whether execution by lethal injection violated the Eighth Amendment.
- Whether the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony concerning Moore's awareness that he was shooting a police officer.
Holdings
- Moore's guilty pleas forfeited any claimed entitlement to a jury determination of the death-eligibility factors. The applicable statute also permitted the court alone to conduct sentencing after a guilty plea and required the court to find the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The evidence was sufficient to support beyond a reasonable doubt the finding that Moore knew Griffin was a law-enforcement officer acting in the course of duty.
- The trial court did not improperly delegate responsibility for considering mitigating evidence to the clemency board or otherwise fail to give mitigation appropriate consideration.
- The length of time Moore spent on death row did not make his execution unconstitutional under either the Eighth Amendment or Article 1, section 15 of the Indiana Constitution.
- Death by lethal injection, as challenged in this case, did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not involve unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain or conflict with societal norms.
- The trial court properly excluded the psychiatrist's opinion that Moore was unaware he was shooting a police officer because the opinion directly concerned intent, guilt, or innocence and was barred by Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b).
Key quotations
“The philosophy of erring on the side of caution would lose much of its vitality in a regime where the state risks being pushed permanently out of bounds if the execution is too long deferred by the process of adjudication.” (771 N.E.2d at 54)
“We decline the defendant's claimed violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (771 N.E.2d at 55)
“We conclude that death by lethal injection does not involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or conflict with societal norms.” (771 N.E.2d at 56)
Factual background
Moore pleaded guilty to the 1979 murders of Rhonda Moore, John Caldwell, and Gerald F. Griffin, an Indianapolis police officer. The State sought the death penalty based in part on the allegation that Griffin was a law-enforcement officer killed while acting in the course of duty. At resentencing, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore knew Griffin was a police officer and imposed death. The court also excluded a psychiatrist's opinion concerning Moore's awareness at the time of the shooting.
Procedural history
Moore pleaded guilty to three murders after the State dismissed six additional charges, and he received a death sentence in 1980. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. In 1995, post-conviction relief was granted, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision in 1997, reinstated the guilty pleas, and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. After a new judge again imposed death, Moore brought this appeal, challenging the jury procedure, aggravating-circumstance finding, mitigation analysis, time on death row, lethal injection, and exclusion of expert testimony.