Kellems v. State

849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 2006) · Supreme Court of Indiana · June 29, 2006 · No. 62S05-0501-CR-15

Summary

The Supreme Court of Indiana granted rehearing to address whether Henry Luke Kellems personally waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that Indiana law requires a defendant's personal waiver to be reflected directly in the record, either in writing or through an open-court colloquy, and that counsel's statement was insufficient. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Court
Supreme Court of Indiana
Writing for the Court
Sullivan, Justice; Shepard, Chief Justice; Dickson, Justice; Boehm, Justice; Rucker, Justice
Jurisdiction
Indiana
Decision date
June 29, 2006
Docket number
62S05-0501-CR-15
Procedural posture
Kellems petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for rehearing after the court held that an informant's tip supplied reasonable suspicion for an investigatory traffic stop. On rehearing, the court addressed whether Kellems validly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial.
Standard of review
The validity of a jury-trial waiver was reviewed de novo as a question of law based on the trial record.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana
Parties
Henry Luke Kellems, Jr. v. State of Indiana
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

jury selectioncriminal proceduresixth amendmentappellate procedurepreservation of error

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Kellems's constitutional right to a jury trial was validly waived when his counsel represented that Kellems agreed to a bench trial, but Kellems did not personally waive the right in writing or in open court.

Holdings

  1. A knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial requires the defendant's personal assent, reflected in the record before trial begins either in a writing signed by the defendant or through the defendant's own statement in open court. Counsel's representation that the defendant agrees to a bench trial, combined with the defendant's silence and presence, is insufficient.

Key quotations

Indiana Code Section 35-37-1-2 (2004), dictates that a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial requires assent to a bench trial "by defendant personally, reflected in the record before the trial begins either in writing or in open court. The record reflection must be direct and not merely implied. It must show the personal communication of the defendant to the court that he chooses to relinquish the right." (849 N.E.2d at 1113)
The trial court did not secure a waiver from Kellems personally. Its failure to do so—and to ensure that the waiver was reflected in the record—necessitates granting Kellems a new trial. (849 N.E.2d at 1114)

Factual background

Kellems was tried and convicted in a bench trial of being a habitual traffic offender and violating probation. He had previously been informed of his right to a jury trial and indicated that he understood that right. At a later status conference, while Kellems was present, defense counsel told the court that Kellems had decided to waive a jury trial, but Kellems himself did not sign a written waiver or personally communicate the waiver to the judge in open court.

Procedural history

Kellems was convicted in a bench trial of being a habitual traffic offender and violating probation. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, including the denial of Kellems's motion to suppress, and concluded that the evidence was insufficient. The Indiana Supreme Court previously held that the tip justified the traffic stop, then granted rehearing to consider Kellems's jury-trial-waiver claim. It reversed and remanded for a new trial because the record did not show a personal waiver by Kellems.

Remand instructions

The matter was remanded for a new trial.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…