Summary
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Kevin L. Hampton's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the refusal of a circumstantial-evidence jury instruction. The court held that a conventional reasonable-doubt instruction does not replace a separate instruction requiring proof to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence when the defendant's actus reus is established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. The court reformulated the instruction and concluded that appellate counsel's omission did not satisfy the Strickland standard.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Indiana law requires a reasonable-theory-of-innocence instruction, in addition to a conventional reasonable-doubt instruction, when the defendant's actus reus is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence.
- Whether DNA evidence matching the defendant to the victim is direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant's criminal conduct.
- Whether appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge on direct appeal the refusal of the reasonable-theory-of-innocence instruction.
Holdings
- When the trial court determines that the defendant's conduct constituting the actus reus of a charged offense is established exclusively by circumstantial evidence, the jury should receive an additional instruction requiring the proof to be so conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence. A conventional reasonable-doubt instruction does not make this additional instruction unnecessary.
- The DNA evidence was direct evidence of Hampton's presence with or prior relationship to the victim, but circumstantial evidence of Hampton's criminal conduct and intent, including the actus reus of the charged offenses.
- Hampton failed to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because, given the unfavorable and unsettled state of Indiana law at the time of trial and direct appeal, counsel's decision not to raise the instruction issue was not unquestionably unreasonable and Hampton failed to establish prejudice.
Key quotations
“We affirm the denial of the defendant's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel but hold that an instruction on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not obviate the necessity, where the conduct of the defendant constituting the commission of a charged offense is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence, of an additional jury instruction advising the jury that proof by circumstantial evidence must be so conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” (961 N.E.2d at 480)
“In determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” (961 N.E.2d at 491)
“The DNA evidence in this case was direct evidence only of the defendant's presence with the victim at some prior time, but only circumstantial as to the defendant's criminal conduct and requisite intent as to each of the charged crimes.” (961 N.E.2d at 494)
Factual background
Hampton was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct arising from the death of D.L. in Terre Haute, Indiana, in 2000. DNA recovered from vaginal swabs and the victim's tank top matched Hampton's DNA profile to a high degree of scientific certainty. Hampton's trial counsel tendered a jury instruction requiring circumstantial proof to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence, but the trial court refused it after treating the DNA evidence as direct evidence.
Procedural history
Hampton was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the reasonable-doubt instruction adequately covered the issue. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, clarified Indiana's circumstantial-evidence instruction rule, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.