Summary
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that second-degree sexual abuse was not a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary under Iowa Code section 701.9, so the convictions should not have been merged. The court also held that the sentencing court lacked authority to determine the duration of the defendant's sex-offender registration obligation because that determination was initially committed to the Department of Public Safety and was not ripe for judicial review. The sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for entry of judgment on both convictions and resentencing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the State had a right to appeal the district court's posttrial merger decision under Iowa Code section 814.5(1)(b), and whether the improperly filed appeal could be treated as a request for discretionary review.
- Whether second-degree sexual abuse is a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary under Iowa Code section 701.9 and the Blockburger legal-elements test.
- Whether the sentencing court had authority to determine the duration of Bullock's future sex-offender registration obligation.
- Whether Bullock's challenge to the duration of his registration obligation was ripe for judicial review before the administrative registration process began.
Holdings
- The State had no appeal as of right under Iowa Code section 814.5(1)(b) because the posttrial merger ruling was not a judgment for the defendant on a motion to the indictment or information.
- The court could treat the State's erroneously filed appeal as though the proper form of review had been sought and grant discretionary review because the merger issue presented an important question of law.
- Second-degree sexual abuse is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary under the charged statutory alternative, so Iowa Code section 701.9 did not authorize merger of the convictions.
- The sentencing court lacked authority to determine the length of Bullock's future sex-offender registration obligation because that determination was initially committed to the Department of Public Safety through an administrative process.
- The challenge to the duration and extent of Bullock's registration obligation was not ripe because the Department of Public Safety had not yet made an administrative determination.
Key quotations
“Therefore, we will consider whether discretionary review should be granted under section 814.5(2).” (at 731)
“As this comparison of the elements of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse shows, each crime contains an element or elements not present in the other offense.” (at 733)
“Until the Department has made a decision on the defendant's term of registration, there is no concrete controversy.” (at 735)
Factual background
Bullock was convicted of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse arising from the same incident on June 25, 1999. The burglary conviction was based on the statutory alternative involving the performance or participation in a sex act constituting sexual abuse. The district court merged the convictions and ordered Bullock, who received a prison sentence, to register as a sex offender for life.
Procedural history
After a four-day jury trial, Bullock was convicted of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse. The district court merged the sexual-abuse conviction into the burglary conviction, imposed a twenty-five-year indeterminate sentence on the burglary charge, and ordered lifetime sex-offender registration. The State appealed the merger ruling, and Bullock cross-appealed the registration order. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, annulled the writ as moot, vacated the sentence, and remanded for entry of judgment on both convictions and resentencing.
Remand instructions
Vacate the sentence; enter judgments of conviction for both first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse; resentence Bullock on both convictions; and omit from the sentencing order any determination of Bullock's responsibility to register as a sex offender.