Christopher J. Godfrey v. State of Iowa; Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Kimberly Reynolds, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; Jeff Boeyink, Chief of Staff to the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Brenna Findley, Legal Counsel to the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; Timothy Albrecht, Communications Director to the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity; and Teresa Wahlert, Director, Iowa Workforce Development, Individually and in Her Official Capacity

847 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 2014) · Supreme Court of Iowa · June 6, 2014 · No. No. 12-2120

Summary

The Iowa Supreme Court held that an Iowa attorney general’s certification under Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) does not apply to common-law claims alleging that state employees acted outside the scope of their employment. The court ruled that the individual defendants could remain parties until a court or fact finder determined whether their conduct was within the scope of employment, at which point the State could be substituted if appropriate. The court reversed and remanded the case to the district court.

Court
Supreme Court of Iowa
Writing for the Court
Wiggins, Justice; Waterman, Justice; Mansfield, Justice
Jurisdiction
Iowa
Decision date
June 6, 2014
Docket number
No. 12-2120
Procedural posture
Interlocutory appeal from a district court order substituting the State of Iowa for individual defendants under Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) and dismissing certain common-law claims.
Standard of review
Statutory interpretation is reviewed for correction of errors at law.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion
Parties
Christopher J. Godfrey v. State of Iowa, Terry Branstad, Kimberly Reynolds, Jeff Boeyink, Brenna Findley, Timothy Albrecht, Teresa Wahlert
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

tortsstatutory interpretationcivil procedurepleadings

Practice areas

tortscivil procedurestatutory interpretationgovernmental immunity

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the attorney general's certification under Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) applies to common-law claims alleging that state employees acted outside the scope of their employment.
  2. Whether the individual defendants may remain parties until a fact finder determines whether their alleged conduct was within the scope of employment.

Holdings

  1. The attorney general's certification under Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) applies only to claims brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act and does not apply to common-law tort claims alleging that state employees acted outside the scope of their employment.
  2. When a factual dispute exists concerning whether a state employee acted within the scope of employment, the employee remains a defendant until the fact finder determines the issue; if the employee is found to have acted within the scope of employment, the State must be substituted as defendant.

Key quotations

Thus, we conclude the attorney general’s certification can only apply to actions brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act and not those brought against an employee acting outside the scope of employment. (847 N.W.2d at 586)
We hold the Iowa Tort Claims Act only applies to torts committed by state employees when acting within the scope of their employment. (847 N.W.2d at 588)

Factual background

Christopher J. Godfrey was appointed Iowa workers' compensation commissioner in 2009 for a six-year term. After Terry Branstad became governor-elect, he demanded Godfrey's resignation; after Godfrey refused, Godfrey alleged that senior officials attempted to intimidate and harass him into resigning and that the governor reduced his salary. Godfrey asserted constitutional and common-law claims against the State and individual officials, including interference, defamation, and extortion claims.

Procedural history

Godfrey sued the State of Iowa and several state officials in their individual and official capacities. After the attorney general certified that the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, the district court granted substitution of the State for the individual defendants on counts VI through XVI and dismissed counts X through XV pursuant to the parties' agreement. The Iowa Supreme Court granted interlocutory review, reversed the substitution and dismissals, and remanded for a fact finder to determine whether the individual defendants acted within the scope of their employment.

Remand instructions

Reverse the district court's substitution of the State in counts VI through XVI and dismissal of counts X through XV. Remand for the fact finder to determine whether each individual defendant's alleged actions were within the scope of employment; if so, the court should substitute the State as defendant.

Court Document

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