Thompson v. Sherwin Williams Co.

113 S.W.3d 140 (Ky. 2003) · Supreme Court of Kentucky · August 21, 2003

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed whether Kentucky Civil Rule 8.01(2) barred a separate jury instruction for future pain and suffering when the plaintiff’s interrogatory response listed a general amount for pain and suffering and a separate category for personal and permanent injuries. The court held that the instruction was permissible because the rule requires disclosure of the amount claimed, not itemization of every category of unliquidated damages. It also held that any error was harmless because the combined award for past and future pain and suffering did not exceed the amount stated in the interrogatory response, and it reinstated the trial court’s judgment.

Court
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Writing for the Court
Justice Cooper
Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Decision date
August 21, 2003
Procedural posture
Sherwin Williams and Stevens sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' partial reversal of a circuit-court judgment awarding damages to the Thompsons. The Supreme Court reviewed only whether the trial court violated CR 8.01(2) by instructing the jury separately on past and future pain and suffering.
Standard of review
Not expressly stated; the Supreme Court reviewed the interpretation and application of CR 8.01(2) and the propriety of the damages instruction.
Precedential value
Published Kentucky Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Jeffery Thompson, Janie Thompson, Sherwin Williams Company, Inc., James E. Stevens v. Jeffery Thompson, Janie Thompson
Disposition
other

Topics

civil procedureappellate procedureharmless errorpersonal injurynegligence

Practice areas

civil proceduretortspersonal injuryappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether CR 8.01(2) prohibited the trial court from instructing the jury separately on past and future pain and suffering when the plaintiffs' interrogatory response listed a general amount for pain and suffering and separately listed personal and permanent injuries.
  2. Whether any error in giving the separate future-pain-and-suffering instruction was harmless because the combined pain-and-suffering award did not exceed the amount stated in the plaintiffs' interrogatory response.

Holdings

  1. CR 8.01(2) requires disclosure of the amount claimed in unliquidated damages but does not require itemization of every category of unliquidated damages for which that amount is claimed.
  2. The trial court properly interpreted the plaintiffs' response as including future pain and suffering within the category of personal and permanent injuries, and the separate instruction was permissible.
  3. Even assuming the separate instruction was erroneous, any error was harmless because the combined award for past and future pain and suffering was less than the amount claimed for pain and suffering in the interrogatory response.

Key quotations

Finally, the purpose and the only requirement of CR 8.01(2) is that information be furnished as to the “amount claimed” in unliquidated damages, not an itemization of each category of unliquidated damages for which that amount is claimed. (at 144)
The damages instruction given in this case did not authorize a verdict in excess of the “amount claimed” in the response to Interrogatory No. 14. (at 144)

Factual background

Janie Thompson was driving a vehicle jointly owned by the Thompsons when it was rear-ended by a van owned by Sherwin Williams and operated by James E. Stevens. The Sherwin Williams van had itself been rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Janet Revuelta, resulting in a chain-reaction collision. The Thompsons claimed personal injuries, pain and suffering, medical expenses, and property damage; the jury ultimately awarded $99,004.50, including $75,000 for future pain and suffering.

Procedural history

After a first trial resulted in a verdict for the Thompsons, the Simpson Circuit Court granted a new trial limited to apportionment because the jury assigned all fault to Stevens and Sherwin Williams despite finding fault and causation by Revuelta as well. At the second trial, fault was apportioned 70 percent to Stevens and Sherwin Williams and 30 percent to Revuelta, while the damages amount from the first verdict was retained. The Court of Appeals vacated the $75,000 award for future pain and suffering based on CR 8.01(2). The Supreme Court reversed that portion of the appellate decision and reinstated the circuit-court judgment in full.

Court Document

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