Summary
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed convictions for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, tampering with physical evidence, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The court held that a warrantless search of the defendant's apartment was constitutional because officers reasonably believed that a purported cotenant had common authority to consent. The court also affirmed the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the complicity-to-murder charge, concluding that the evidence did not establish the intent required for complicity or facilitation to intentional murder.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the warrantless search of the apartment violated Nourse's rights under the Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution because the consenting third parties lacked actual authority.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Nourse's conviction for tampering with physical evidence.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's JNOV vacating the conviction for complicity to murder.
- Whether the trial court was required to enter a conviction for the lesser included offense of facilitation to intentional murder after setting aside the complicity conviction.
Holdings
- A warrantless search is constitutional when, under the facts available at the time of the search, a reasonable officer would believe that the consenting third party had common authority over the premises, even if that authority was only apparent rather than actual.
- The evidence was sufficient to submit the tampering charge to the jury and to sustain the conviction because the circumstances supported an inference that Nourse knowingly disposed of the spent cartridge casings with awareness that an official proceeding might be instituted.
- The evidence was insufficient to establish that Nourse intended to aid, promote, or facilitate Terry's murder; therefore, the trial court properly granted JNOV and vacated the complicity-to-murder conviction.
- The trial court was not required to enter a conviction for facilitation to intentional murder because the evidence did not establish that Nourse knew Terry intended to commit intentional murder when Nourse loaned him the gun.
Key quotations
“The test for whether third-party consent is valid is whether a reasonable police officer faced with the prevailing facts reasonably believed that the consenting party had common authority over the premises to be searched.” (696)
“Rather, the Court explained that the concept of common authority is meant to rest on the premise that any cohabitant "has the right to permit the inspection [of his living space] in his own right and that the other [cohabitants] have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched."” (697)
“Rather, the Commonwealth must prove that Appellant had knowledge of the principal's intention to commit intentional murder, and with that knowledge, nonetheless, provided the principal with means to commit that crime.” (700)
Factual background
Nourse loaned his handgun to Denarrius Terry during the early morning hours of December 25, 2001. Terry used the gun to murder and rob a man at a private gambling club. After Terry returned, Nourse disposed of spent cartridge casings, washed blood from money, and later learned that Terry had killed the victim. Police subsequently found the handgun during a warrantless search of the apartment where Nourse was staying, based on consent from the landlord and Heather Warden, who appeared to officers to be Nourse's girlfriend and a resident of the apartment.
Procedural history
A Logan County Circuit Court jury convicted Nourse of complicity to murder, tampering with physical evidence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court granted Nourse's postverdict JNOV motion as to complicity to murder but denied it as to the other convictions, imposing a sentence of no more than twenty years. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed both the remaining convictions and the order vacating the complicity conviction.