Interlock Industries, Inc. v. Rawlings

358 S.W.3d 925 (Ky. 2011) · Supreme Court of Kentucky · October 27, 2011

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that injuries suffered while a truck driver removed and rolled straps during the unloading of a tractor-trailer arose from conduct integral to unloading, rather than from the use of a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. Accordingly, the Act’s two-year statute of limitations did not apply, and the one-year personal injury limitations period governed. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment for the defendants.

Court
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Writing for the Court
Justice Schroder; Chief Justice Minton; Justice Abramson; Justice Cunningham; Justice Noble; Justice Scott; Justice Venters
Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Decision date
October 27, 2011
Procedural posture
Discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' reversal of summary judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of the defendants.
Standard of review
Summary judgment is reviewed de novo; the appellate court determines whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Precedential value
Published Kentucky Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Interlock Industries, Inc., Ohio Valley Aluminum Company, LLC v. Charles Rawlings
Disposition
reversed

Topics

statutory interpretationpersonal injuryinsurancestandard of reviewappellate procedure

Practice areas

TortsInsuranceStatutory interpretationAppellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the one-year personal-injury statute of limitations in KRS 413.140(1)(a) or the two-year Motor Vehicle Reparations Act limitations period in KRS 304.39-230(6) governed Rawlings's action.
  2. Whether releasing the straps and chains and rolling the straps while the tractor-trailer was being unloaded constituted conduct integral to unloading and therefore was excluded from the MVRA's definition of use of a motor vehicle.
  3. Whether Rawlings's receipt of basic reparation benefits independently made the MVRA's two-year limitations period applicable.

Holdings

  1. Conduct integral to loading or unloading a vehicle does not constitute 'use of a motor vehicle' under KRS 304.39-020(6)(b), unless the conduct occurs while the person is occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.
  2. Releasing the straps and chains and rolling the straps was a continuous and integral part of unloading the tractor-trailer.
  3. The one-year personal-injury statute of limitations in KRS 413.140(1)(a) applied because the injury arose from conduct excluded from the MVRA's definition of motor-vehicle use.
  4. Rawlings's receipt of basic reparation benefits did not make the MVRA's two-year limitations period applicable because the action must first fall within the MVRA.

Key quotations

This Court opines that Rawlings’ activity, like that in Hudson, in removing the straps and chains from the load and rolling the straps was a continuous, integral part of the unloading process. (928)
Removal of the straps was an integral part of the unloading process. (928)
Therefore, for the reasons previously stated, the trial court correctly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140(l)(a). (928)

Factual background

Charles Rawlings, a contract truck driver, transported aluminum bundles to Kentucky. After the load shifted, a forklift operator began unloading the rear bundles while Rawlings released the straps and chains securing the front bundles and rolled the detached straps. An aluminum bundle fell and injured Rawlings, who filed suit approximately thirteen months after the incident.

Procedural history

Charles Rawlings sued after being injured by an aluminum bundle while rolling straps beside his tractor-trailer during unloading. The Shelby Circuit Court granted the defendants summary judgment, concluding that the one-year personal-injury statute of limitations applied rather than the two-year Motor Vehicle Reparations Act limitations period. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Rawlings's conduct was not part of unloading. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review, reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the circuit court's order.

Remand instructions

The Court of Appeals' opinion was reversed, and the order of the Shelby Circuit Court granting summary judgment was reinstated.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…