Commonwealth v. Tigue

459 S.W.3d 372 (Ky. 2015) · Supreme Court of Kentucky · May 14, 2015

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that a defendant’s pre-judgment request to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage at which the right to counsel attaches. It further held that Shawn Tigue was effectively denied counsel when his attorneys refused to assist with withdrawing the plea. The court nevertheless addressed his ineffective-assistance claim and concluded that counsel’s failure to investigate an alleged alternative perpetrator warranted reversal of the conviction and sentence and remand for possible trial.

Court
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Writing for the Court
Justice Noble
Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Decision date
May 14, 2015
Procedural posture
Discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' decision reversing Tigue's convictions and sentence and remanding for a new trial after finding that he was denied counsel during a critical stage when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea. Tigue also sought discretionary review on additional ineffective-assistance claims.
Standard of review
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally reviewed under the two-part Strickland test. In the guilty-plea context, prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial. The voluntariness of a guilty plea is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances; factual determinations receive deference, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Shawn Tigue
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

plea bargainingright to counselineffective assistancepost-conviction reliefcriminal procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawpost-conviction reliefineffective assistance of counselplea bargaining

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a defendant's presentencing request to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of criminal proceedings at which the right to counsel attaches.
  2. Whether counsel's refusal to assist with the request to withdraw the guilty plea, together with counsel's conflict of interest, constituted a per se violation of the right to counsel.
  3. What remedy follows from denial of counsel during a presentencing plea-withdrawal proceeding.
  4. Whether counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate an alleged alternative perpetrator and other potentially exculpatory evidence before advising Tigue to plead guilty.
  5. Whether counsel's deficient investigation and preparation prejudiced Tigue in the guilty-plea context.

Holdings

  1. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before entry of the final judgment of conviction and sentence is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings at which the defendant has a right to counsel.
  2. Tigue was completely denied counsel and was deprived of conflict-free counsel when his attorneys refused to assist with his presentencing request to withdraw his guilty plea and one attorney made statements undermining his allegations.
  3. The denial of counsel during the presentencing plea-withdrawal request required vacatur of the judgment and remand for further proceedings, but did not itself require vacatur of the guilty plea, an automatic new trial, or a mandatory evidentiary hearing.
  4. Tigue's counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate Danny Smith's potential role as the murderer, failing to investigate witnesses and forensic evidence, and preparing only to negotiate a plea rather than to defend the guilt phase at trial.
  5. Tigue established prejudice because, but for counsel's deficient investigation and preparation, there was a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to trial; that decision would have been rational under the circumstances.

Key quotations

We agree and thus hold that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before entry of the final judgment of conviction and sentence is a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings to which the right to counsel attaches. (384)
The decision to seek to withdraw a guilty plea is not merely trial strategy, and cannot be made by counsel. (386)
Because Lundy refused to assist Tigue in moving to withdraw the guilty plea, he may as well not have been present. (388)
It was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel in these circumstances to summarily concede their client’s guilt and dismiss out of hand his claim of innocence without making any effort to investigate the legitimacy of that claim. (397)

Factual background

Bertha Bradshaw was murdered in her Bell County home by a shotgun blast, and property including prescription pills, a shotgun, and a canvas bag was taken. Police found Tigue in a truck associated with the crime, possessing Bradshaw's prescription pills and the bag containing shotgun shells, and he later confessed after questioning. Tigue nevertheless maintained that his confession was false and that Danny Smith had murdered Bradshaw before directing Tigue to retrieve property from the home. Tigue's appointed counsel did not investigate Smith, other neighbors, or potentially exculpatory forensic evidence and instead focused on negotiating a plea to avoid the death penalty. Tigue pleaded guilty, then sought to withdraw the plea before sentencing.

Procedural history

Tigue pleaded guilty to murder and first-degree burglary under a plea agreement providing for life imprisonment without probation or parole for twenty-five years. Before sentencing, he orally sought to withdraw the plea, but trial counsel did not assist him and the trial court denied the request without addressing its merits. Tigue later sought relief under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 and Civil Rule 60.02; the trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment while modifying the reasoning and relief: it held that the plea-withdrawal proceeding was a critical stage, but that the resulting remedy on that ground was vacatur of the judgment and remand for further proceedings. The Supreme Court separately held that counsel's deficient pretrial investigation caused Tigue to enter an involuntary guilty plea, requiring vacatur of the plea and convictions and remand.

Remand instructions

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, but the relief is clarified. Tigue's convictions and guilty plea are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Bell Circuit Court for further proceedings as necessary. If Tigue seeks to withdraw his plea, he is entitled to assistance of conflict-free counsel and to be heard on his claims; the court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing unless further proceedings require one.

Court Document

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