Summary
The Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord for wanton murder arising from the death of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause, depriving the defendants of the full use of their peremptory challenges, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings; it addressed other issues only to the extent they might recur on retrial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether either appellant was entitled to a directed verdict because the evidence did not establish that he or she was the principal or an accomplice.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike prospective jurors 27 and 75 for cause.
- Whether a combination principal-or-accomplice wanton-murder instruction was permissible when the evidence supported the principal theory but did not support Futrell's complicity theory.
- Whether the murder instructions improperly permitted a finding that blunt-force trauma to body parts other than the head caused death.
- Whether expert testimony from a child-abuse pediatrician regarding inflicted rather than accidental injury was admissible under KRE 702, Daubert, and KRE 403.
- Whether the defendants received too few peremptory challenges in their joint trial.
- Whether the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination concerning a prosecution witness's revocable pretrial-diversion agreement.
- Whether autopsy photographs and prior-act evidence were admissible.
- Whether lesser-included-offense instructions were required.
Holdings
- Neither appellant was entitled to a directed verdict because, construed favorably to the Commonwealth, the evidence permitted a reasonable juror to find that either appellant or both appellants inflicted the fatal injuries as a principal.
- The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike prospective jurors 27 and 75 for cause. The error was presumptively prejudicial because the defendants used peremptory strikes to remove the jurors, exhausted their peremptory challenges, and one otherwise-challenged juror served on the jury.
- A combination principal-or-accomplice instruction is proper only when the evidence supports both alternative theories. Lord could be retried on a complicity theory based on her legal duty to protect the child, but Futrell could not be retried on complicity because the evidence did not support that theory.
- The murder instruction was erroneous to the extent it allowed conviction based on blunt-force trauma to the torso or other body parts because the evidence established only head trauma as the cause of death.
- The trial court properly admitted the child-abuse pediatrician's opinion that the child's injuries were inflicted rather than accidental under KRE 702 and KRE 403.
- The trial court granted the jointly tried defendants too few peremptory challenges. Under RCr 9.40, two jointly tried defendants were entitled to thirteen rather than eleven challenges.
- The trial court improperly barred impeachment cross-examination of a prosecution witness concerning his revocable pretrial-diversion agreement.
- The trial court did not err by admitting nonredundant autopsy photographs or prior-act evidence concerning bruising, physical discipline, verbal abuse, and conduct endangering the child.
Key quotations
“When there is uncertainty about whether a prospective juror should be stricken for causes, the prospective juror should be stricken. The trial court should err on the side of caution by striking the doubtful juror.” (272)
“Futrell could not be complicit in his own killing of the child.” (280)
“The court’s role is not to judge the correctness of the expert’s conclusions; that assessment is for the jury.” (282)
Factual background
Seventeen-month-old Staten Stephenson was brought to a hospital with extensive bruising, severe head injuries, abdominal injuries, and a ruptured stomach and intestine. Medical evidence attributed his death to hypoxic-ischemic brain injury caused by blunt-force trauma to the head, and the Commonwealth presented evidence that the child had been normal shortly before the fatal episode and that Futrell and Lord were the only people with access to him during the relevant period. The defense claimed that the child choked on chewing gum, that CPR caused or aggravated the injuries, and that earlier or accidental events explained the bruising and trauma.
Procedural history
A Wayne County grand jury indicted each appellant for murder and first-degree criminal abuse. After the Commonwealth dismissed the criminal-abuse charge and amended the indictments to include wanton murder and complicity theories, the jointly tried defendants were convicted of wanton murder under a combination principal-or-accomplice instruction. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the trial court improperly refused to strike two prospective jurors for cause, and it identified additional instructional errors likely to recur on retrial.
Remand instructions
Reverse both Wayne Circuit Court judgments and remand for further proceedings. Lord may be retried as a principal or accomplice for intentional or wanton murder. Futrell may be retried as a principal for intentional or wanton murder but may not be retried on a complicity theory. Any retrial must use a cause-of-death instruction conforming to the evidence and must address the juror-cause, peremptory-challenge, cross-examination, and other rulings identified in the opinion.