Champion v. Commonwealth

520 S.W.3d 331 (Ky. 2017) · Supreme Court of Kentucky · February 16, 2017

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Lexington-Fayette Ordinance 14-5, which criminalized begging and solicitation on public streets and at intersections, was an unconstitutional content-based restriction of protected speech under the First Amendment. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interests in public safety and traffic flow. The court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for dismissal of the charge.

Court
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Writing for the Court
Chief Justice Minton; Minton, C.J.; Hughes, J.; Keller, J.; Venters, J.; Wright, J.; Cunningham, J.; VanMeter, J.
Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Decision date
February 16, 2017
Procedural posture
Appeal from a judgment of conviction entered after a conditional guilty plea to violating Lexington-Fayette Urban County Ordinance 14-5; the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review of the circuit court's affirmance.
Standard of review
Strict scrutiny applies to facially content-based regulations of protected speech in a traditional public forum. The government bears the burden of proving that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Precedential value
Published Kentucky Supreme Court opinion; precedential
Parties
Dennis Champion v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

free speechfirst amendmentstrict scrutinyordinancesconstitutional law

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightsmunicipal lawFirst Amendment litigation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Lexington-Fayette Urban County Ordinance 14-5 is a content-based regulation of protected speech under the First Amendment.
  2. Whether Ordinance 14-5 survives strict scrutiny.
  3. Whether Champion's conviction under the ordinance must be reversed and the charge dismissed.

Holdings

  1. Panhandling is constitutionally protected speech and must be reviewed under the same First Amendment standards applicable to other protected expression.
  2. Ordinance 14-5 is a facially content-based regulation of speech because it singles out messages seeking financial assistance while leaving other messages lawful in the same traditional public forums.
  3. Ordinance 14-5 fails strict scrutiny because the government did not establish that prohibiting begging and solicitation alone furthers a compelling interest or is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

Key quotations

So we are confident that case law and normative considerations support the ultimate conclusion that panhandling is constitutionally protected speech. (335)
On its face, Ordinance 14-5 singles out speech for criminal liability based solely on its particularized message. (338)
So under a close and careful review of First Amendment precedent and principles, we must unavoidably hold that Lexington Ordinance 14-5 is an unconstitutional regulation of speech. (339)

Factual background

Champion stood at a prominent Lexington intersection holding a handmade sign seeking financial assistance. A law-enforcement officer cited and arrested him for violating Ordinance 14-5, which criminalized begging or soliciting on public streets or at public-street intersections. The ordinance imposed a fine, imprisonment, or both, and applied to conduct seeking any form of financial contribution.

Procedural history

Champion was arrested and charged with violating Lexington-Fayette Urban County Ordinance 14-5, which prohibited begging or soliciting on public streets and at public-street intersections. After failing to appear, he was arrested, arraigned, and entered a conditional guilty plea in district court. The district court entered judgment, the circuit court affirmed on appeal, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals declined discretionary review. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded for dismissal of the charge.

Remand instructions

Remand to the Fayette District Court with direction to dismiss the charge against Champion.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…