Summary
The Kentucky Supreme Court consolidated four appeals concerning whether Kentucky recognizes a standalone tort of negligent credentialing against hospitals for granting staff privileges to nonemployee physicians. The Court rejected negligent credentialing as a separate cause of action, holding that existing common-law negligence principles allow claims based on a hospital's negligent selection of physicians. It remanded the Adams and Jones cases for further proceedings and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded regarding the Spalding case.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Kentucky recognizes negligent credentialing as a separate tort against a hospital for granting or continuing staff privileges to a nonemployee physician.
- Whether Adams's claim was properly dismissed when the trial court relied only on the nonrecognition of negligent credentialing.
- Whether Jones's hospital-negligence claim was barred by the statute of limitations or whether genuine issues existed regarding when the claim accrued and whether attorney knowledge could be imputed to her.
- Whether the Spaldings' settlement and dismissal of their claim against Dr. Bailey barred their claim against Spring View.
- Whether the Spaldings presented sufficient expert testimony concerning Spring View's standard of care and breach.
Holdings
- Kentucky does not recognize negligent credentialing as a stand-alone cause of action. A plaintiff may instead pursue a common-law negligence claim against a hospital for its own negligent selection or credentialing of physicians.
- A claim alleging the hospital's own negligence in credentialing or selecting a physician is derivative of the underlying medical-malpractice claim to the extent that the plaintiff must prove the physician's negligence and resulting harm to establish causation.
- The trial court erred in dismissing Adams's claim solely because negligent credentialing was not a recognized cause of action, because Adams could pursue a viable common-law negligence theory against the hospital.
- Summary judgment was inappropriate on the statute-of-limitations issue because genuine factual issues existed regarding when Jones discovered or should have discovered an injury attributable to Spring View, and knowledge obtained by her attorney while representing another client could not automatically be imputed to Jones.
- The Spaldings' settlement and dismissal of their claim against Dr. Bailey without an admission of fault did not bar their independent negligence claim against Spring View.
- Summary judgment for Spring View was proper because the Spaldings' expert improperly treated the hospital's internal bylaws as establishing a heightened legal standard of care and therefore did not provide sufficient testimony concerning the applicable standard and breach.
Key quotations
“It is clear that the duty on hospitals to employ competent staff has existed in the Commonwealth at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. There is no need for this Court to establish a new tort specifically applying to hospitals.” (13)
“The standard of care a hospital owes to a patient is that standard expected of a reasonably competent hospital, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” (23)
“For the foregoing reasons, this Court declines to recognize a new tort of negligent credentialing in the Commonwealth.” (24)
Factual background
The consolidated cases arose from injuries allegedly caused by physicians who held staff privileges at Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital or Spring View Hospital. The patients alleged that the hospitals negligently granted or continued privileges despite information concerning physician qualifications, prior conduct, or failure to satisfy hospital credentialing bylaws. In the Spalding case, Joseph Spalding suffered serious complications after knee surgery by Dr. Daniel Bailey, ultimately requiring above-knee amputation; the plaintiffs' hospital-liability claim remained after settling or dismissing their claim against Bailey without an admission of fault.
Procedural history
In the Adams case, the Pulaski Circuit Court granted judgment on the pleadings to the hospital because negligent credentialing was not a recognized Kentucky cause of action. In the Jones case, the Marion Circuit Court dismissed the negligent-credentialing claim, while the Court of Appeals affirmed denial of the hospital's statute-of-limitations summary-judgment motion. In the Spalding case, the Marion Circuit Court granted judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment to Spring View, including on the ground that the plaintiffs' expert testimony was insufficient; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed recognition of negligent credentialing as a separate tort, remanded Adams and Jones for further proceedings under common-law negligence theories, and affirmed the Spalding judgment.
Remand instructions
Remand the Adams and Jones cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Adams may proceed under common-law negligence theories rather than a stand-alone negligent-credentialing tort. Jones may proceed because summary judgment on the statute-of-limitations issue was inappropriate. The Spalding judgment for Spring View is affirmed and the trial court's dismissal order is reinstated.