Summary
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an order protecting Rozanna Patane from harassment by her neighbor, Philip Brown, during a dispute over a shared right-of-way. The court held that the protection order did not improperly affect title to real property and that Brown's threatening conduct, considered together with his use of a chain saw near Patane's home, supported a finding of criminal threatening under Maine law.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the District Court could entertain a protection-from-harassment complaint when the parties also had a pending dispute concerning title to the real estate involved.
- Whether Brown's conduct was excluded from the statutory definition of harassment because he allegedly had a legal right to cut the bush in the right-of-way.
- Whether the evidence supported a finding that Brown committed criminal threatening by intentionally or knowingly placing Patane in fear of imminent bodily injury.
- Whether the evidence supported a finding that Brown committed reckless conduct sufficient to constitute harassment.
Holdings
- A court may entertain a protection-from-harassment complaint even when the underlying dispute concerns ownership of real property, so long as the protection order does not affect title to the property.
- Whether Brown had a legal right to cut the bush was not dispositive because the harassment claim was based on his threatening conduct toward Patane, not merely on the act of cutting the bush.
- The evidence supported the District Court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Brown committed criminal threatening by intentionally placing Patane in fear of imminent bodily injury.
- The court did not decide whether Brown committed reckless conduct because the criminal-threatening finding independently supported issuance of the protection order.
Key quotations
“The order issued in this case does not affect title to real estate, and section 4655(4) does not prohibit a court from entertaining a complaint for harassment merely because the underlying dispute between the parties concerns property ownership.” (at 1088)
“Thus, the court implicitly found that it was Brown’s “conscious object” to cause Patane to be in fear of imminent bodily injury.” (at 1089)
“Because we conclude that the evidence supports the court’s determination that the plaintiff proved the elements of criminal threatening by a preponderance of the evidence and because the court’s determination that Brown committed criminal threatening was sufficient for the issuance of the protection order, we do not reach Brown’s final contention on appeal that Patane failed to prove reckless conduct.” (at 1090)
Factual background
Patane and Brown were neighboring property owners involved in a dispute over ownership of a thirty-foot right-of-way, which was the subject of a pending declaratory judgment action in Superior Court. Brown cut a bush in the disputed right-of-way near Patane's home with a chain saw despite Patane's objections. During a subsequent struggle over branches, Brown caused Patane to fall, leaned over her while repeatedly mocking her in a threatening manner, and made a remark about her rake; the District Court found that Patane was frightened and that Brown's purpose was to intimidate her.
Procedural history
Patane obtained a temporary protection order and, after a hearing at which both parties presented testimony and witnesses, the District Court entered a final protection-from-harassment order against Brown. Brown appealed, arguing that the pending real-estate title dispute deprived the District Court of authority to decide the harassment complaint, that his conduct was legally protected, and that the evidence did not establish criminal threatening or reckless conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment, declined to reach the reckless-conduct issue, and remanded solely for determination of appellate attorney fees.
Remand instructions
The judgment was affirmed, but the case was remanded to the District Court to determine attorney fees on appeal.