Summary
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed consolidated challenges to the retroactive application of Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999. The court held that claims by individuals removed from the registry were moot and concluded that the amended registration scheme did not violate the constitutional rights of the remaining litigants. The decision affirmed the Superior Court’s summary judgment for state officials.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether claims by plaintiffs who had been removed from the sex-offender registry were moot.
- Whether the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, as amended after State v. Letalien, violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions.
- Whether SORNA of 1999 violated equal protection.
- Whether SORNA of 1999 violated procedural due process by imposing a classification without a hearing.
- Whether SORNA of 1999 violated substantive due process rights to privacy, reputation, property, or pursuit of happiness.
- Whether the registration requirements imposed more punishment than the plaintiffs agreed to in plea agreements or violated a constitutional right to contract or fundamental fairness.
- Whether SORNA of 1999 violated the Maine Civil Rights Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Whether the factual record was insufficient to support summary judgment.
- Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees or reimbursement of registration-related payments.
Holdings
- Claims of plaintiffs who had been relieved of the duty to register were moot because no real and substantial controversy remained and the asserted future consequences were conjectural. The exceptions for collateral consequences, issues of great public concern, and issues capable of repetition but evading review did not apply.
- SORNA of 1999, as amended after Letalien, was nonpunitive in purpose and effect as applied to the plaintiffs and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States or Maine Constitutions.
- SORNA of 1999 did not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or Maine Constitutions.
- SORNA of 1999 did not require an individualized hearing because the statute did not deprive the plaintiffs of a protected liberty or property interest.
- SORNA of 1999 did not violate substantive due process because it did not implicate a fundamental right or liberty interest and was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of public safety.
- The plaintiffs were not entitled to prospective relief, damages, reimbursement of registration fees, or other monetary relief under the Maine Civil Rights Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The Superior Court properly granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.
- The plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and were not entitled to attorney fees under § 1983 or the Maine Civil Rights Act.
Key quotations
“A statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses if it “makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after it has been committed.”” (¶ 23)
“After considering all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that SORNA of 1999 is nonpunitive.” (¶ 51)
“A state action is an infringement on due process rights pursuant to the stigma-plus test only if it both negatively affects an individual’s reputation and alters the legal status of an individual in a manner that affects his or her liberty” (¶ 62)
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision that SORNA of 1999 is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law.” (¶ 84)
Factual background
John Doe I was convicted of unlawful sexual contact with a family member in 1985 and had no subsequent sex-offense convictions. Maine later amended SORNA of 1999 to apply retroactively to sex offenders sentenced on or after January 1, 1982, requiring certain offenders to register for ten years or life. Subsequent amendments created exceptions from registration and reduced reporting obligations, but several plaintiffs remained subject to registration and challenged the statute under the federal and Maine Constitutions, the Maine Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Procedural history
John Doe I initially sued State officials after SORNA of 1999 was applied retroactively to him. The Superior Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Law Court remanded for factual development and consideration of the remaining claims in Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139. On remand, the case was consolidated with claims by other sex offenders. After statutory amendments and the removal of several plaintiffs from the registry, the Superior Court ruled that the removed plaintiffs' claims were moot and granted the State defendants summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Law Court affirmed.