Summary
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Eric N. Fitzpatrick’s M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion challenging a Maine custody judgment. The court held that Maine retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and PKPA because Maine remained the residence of a contestant, and that the trial court acted within its discretion under 19-A M.R.S. § 1740 in communicating with the Pennsylvania court without allowing the parties to participate.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Maine retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child-custody matter under the PKPA and UCCJEA despite the Pennsylvania court's interim order.
- Whether the Maine District Court violated 19-A M.R.S. § 1740 by declining to allow the parties to participate in its communication with the Pennsylvania court and by not giving Fitzpatrick another opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before deciding jurisdiction.
Holdings
- Maine retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction because it had initial child-custody jurisdiction, Maine remained the residence of a contestant, and no court had made the determinations required to terminate Maine's continuing jurisdiction under 19-A M.R.S. § 1746(1)(A) or (B). The Pennsylvania court's interim order did not implicitly determine that McCrary no longer resided in Maine.
- Section 1740 gives the trial court discretion both whether to communicate with an out-of-state court and whether to allow the parties to participate in that communication. If the court permits communication but the parties cannot participate, § 1740(2) requires an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before jurisdiction is decided; that condition did not apply here. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Fitzpatrick a third opportunity to address jurisdiction.
Key quotations
“If the judgment is void, there is no room for the court to exercise discretion—the judgment must be set aside.” (¶ 8)
“Accordingly, because the word ‘may’ in sections 1740(1) and (2) is permissive rather than mandatory, we conclude that it is left to the trial court’s sound discretion both whether to communicate with a court from another state and whether to allow parties to participate in that communication.” (¶ 16)
“In contrast to the permissive language contained in section 1740(1) and in the first sentence of section 1740(2), the Legislature’s use of the mandatory verb “must” plainly provides that if the court allows the parties to participate in its communication with an out-of-state court—but the parties are not able to participate in that conversation—the court is then required to provide those parties an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” (¶ 17)
Factual background
Fitzpatrick and McCrary are the parents of a child born in 2013. Maine entered an initial parental-rights order and later modified it by agreement to give Fitzpatrick primary residence. After McCrary sought contempt and modification relief, Fitzpatrick obtained an interim Pennsylvania order purporting to supersede prior orders, but McCrary continued to reside in Maine and the Pennsylvania court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction to Maine.
Procedural history
The Maine District Court initially entered a shared-parental-rights order awarding McCrary primary residence, later modified the order by agreement to award Fitzpatrick primary residence, and subsequently granted McCrary's motion to modify and restored her primary residence. While the Maine proceedings were pending, Fitzpatrick obtained an interim order from a Pennsylvania court purporting to supersede prior orders, but that court later relinquished jurisdiction and determined that jurisdiction lay with the Maine District Court. The Maine court denied Fitzpatrick's Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from judgment and his motion for findings of fact, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.