Lee Boyd Malvo v. State of Maryland

Summary

The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed Lee Boyd Malvo’s interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of his motion to vacate or withdraw his guilty plea and the delay in resentencing. The court held that the order was not final and did not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine because no plea agreement existed, the plea-withdrawal issue was intertwined with the merits, and the alleged sentencing delay could be reviewed after final judgment. The court also concluded that due process concerns arising from the delay were reviewable following sentencing.

Holdings

1. Because Maryland law requires an application for leave to appeal from a final judgment following a guilty plea, the court exercised its discretion to treat Malvo's notice of appeal and briefs as an application for leave to appeal and granted the application.
2. An order denying a motion to vacate or withdraw a guilty plea that has already been accepted is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it is not completely separate from the merits of guilt or innocence and remains reviewable after final judgment and sentencing.
3. An order delaying sentencing is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine when the alleged due process violation from the delay can be reviewed after final judgment.
4. No enforceable plea agreement existed that required the State to secure Malvo's presence for resentencing or otherwise warranted withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the notice of appeal and briefs should be treated as an application for leave to appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a guilty plea.
2. Whether an order denying a motion to vacate or withdraw an accepted guilty plea is immediately appealable under Maryland's collateral order doctrine.
3. Whether an order delaying resentencing until completion of sentences in another state is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
4. Whether the alleged inability to obtain an in-person resentencing constituted a breach of a plea agreement warranting withdrawal of the guilty plea.

Disposition

dismissed