Paneccasio v. Karr

1990 Mass. App. Div. 185 (1990) · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · November 1, 1990

Summary

The Massachusetts Appellate Division held that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 260, section 9, including its borrowing clause, did not bar a Connecticut resident’s personal-injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident in Massachusetts. Relying on Wilcox v. Riverside Park Enterprises, Inc., the court reversed summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Court
Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division
Writing for the Court
McGuane, J.; Dohoney, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
November 1, 1990
Procedural posture
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's allowance of the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a personal-injury action arising from a motor-vehicle accident.
Standard of review
Review of the allowance of summary judgment for legal error, including interpretation and application of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 9.
Precedential value
published appellate decision
Parties
Sharon Paneccasio v. Alexander V. Karr
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

statute of limitationssummary judgmentstatutory interpretationappellate procedurepersonal injury

Practice areas

tortscivil procedurestatute of limitationsstatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Massachusetts General Laws chapter 260, section 9 barred the plaintiff's Massachusetts personal-injury action because the claim was barred by Connecticut's shorter statute of limitations.
  2. Whether the defendant was considered a Massachusetts resident for purposes of section 9 because he was subject to service of process in Massachusetts.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing summary judgment for the defendant.

Holdings

  1. The borrowing clause in section 9 does not have independent effect; it qualifies only the tolling provisions of the statute. Because the plaintiff was not invoking the tolling provisions, the borrowing clause did not bar her action.
  2. For purposes of chapter 260, section 9, a defendant is considered a Massachusetts resident if he is subject to service of process in the Commonwealth.
  3. The allowance of the defendant's motion for summary judgment was error and constituted prejudicial error.

Factual background

The plaintiff and defendant were Connecticut residents when the accident occurred and remained so through trial. On August 10, 1986, at Riverside Park in Agawam, Massachusetts, the plaintiff alleged that she was struck by the defendant's vehicle while leaving the parking lot and sustained personal injuries. She brought the action in Massachusetts within the Commonwealth's three-year tort limitations period, although Connecticut's limitations period was two years.

Procedural history

The plaintiff, a Connecticut resident, sued the defendant, also a Connecticut resident, in Massachusetts for injuries sustained in a Massachusetts motor-vehicle accident. The plaintiff filed within Massachusetts's three-year limitations period but outside Connecticut's two-year period. The trial court applied Massachusetts General Laws chapter 260, section 9, allowed summary judgment for the defendant, and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for further trial.

Remand instructions

The case was remanded to the Springfield Division of the District Court Department for further trial.

Court Document

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