Commonwealth v. Chase

433 Mass. 293 (2001) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · January 29, 2001

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial following his convictions for second-degree felony-murder and motor vehicle homicide. The court held that the defendant waived claims concerning the omission of an involuntary manslaughter instruction by failing to raise them on direct appeal, but reviewed the omission for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Although the court concluded that the instruction should have been given, it found no substantial risk because the jury had a comparable motor vehicle homicide option and trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Greaney, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
January 29, 2001
Procedural posture
The defendant appealed from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his motion for a new trial following convictions of murder in the second degree and motor vehicle homicide. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.
Standard of review
Claims omitted from trial or direct appeal are generally waived; because the instructional claims were raised for the first time in the new-trial proceedings, the court reviewed them for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Ineffective-assistance claims were considered under Commonwealth v. Saferian, and the court reviewed the denial of the new-trial motion for abuse of discretion or error of law.
Precedential value
Published Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion; binding precedent in Massachusetts.
Parties
Commonwealth v. Chase
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

post-conviction reliefineffective assistancejury instructionslesser included offense instructionspreservation of error

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurepost-conviction reliefappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the defendant waived on post-conviction review his claims that the judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and that counsel was ineffective for objecting to that instruction.
  2. Whether the omission of an involuntary-manslaughter instruction created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
  3. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by objecting to the involuntary-manslaughter instruction without the defendant's consent.
  4. Whether the judge was required to conduct a colloquy to determine whether the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived the instruction.

Holdings

  1. The defendant waived his claims concerning the omitted involuntary-manslaughter instruction and counsel's objection because the legal theory underlying those claims was sufficiently developed before his direct appeal to give appellate counsel a genuine opportunity to raise them.
  2. When requested by the Commonwealth, a judge must instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, or another lesser included offense, when the evidence warrants the instruction, notwithstanding the defendant's objection or strategic preference.
  3. The failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because the jury had a comparable lesser option in the motor vehicle homicide charge and the Commonwealth's evidence supporting second-degree felony-murder was strong.
  4. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for objecting to the involuntary-manslaughter instruction because the objection was a reasonable trial strategy under the circumstances.
  5. A judge is not required to conduct a colloquy with a defendant before honoring counsel's objection to a lesser-included-offense instruction; in any event, the judge could not lawfully omit a warranted instruction based on the defendant's wishes.

Key quotations

A defendant generally may not raise any ground in a motion for a new trial that could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on direct appeal. (297)
A defendant cannot be held to have waived a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that had no legal support at the time of his trial and appeal. (298)
The judge should have given an involuntary manslaughter instruction. (299)
We have never required a colloquy in such circumstances and do not do so now. (303)

Factual background

The defendant stole a truck from a shopping mall while its owner, Albert Renauld, ran toward the vehicle. The defendant drove directly toward Renauld, struck him, and fled; Renauld died the next day from head injuries. The defendant later told police that he would not stop and would have shot Renauld rather than stop. The evidence also supported an alternative view that the truck's side-view mirror struck Renauld as he ran into the road, potentially supporting involuntary manslaughter rather than murder.

Procedural history

The defendant pleaded guilty to two larceny charges and was convicted by a jury of second-degree felony-murder and motor vehicle homicide. The motor vehicle homicide indictment was dismissed as duplicative of the murder conviction, and the murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The defendant later moved for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance based on counsel's objection to an involuntary-manslaughter instruction and, in a supplemental brief, asserting instructional-error and colloquy claims. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Court Document

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