Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Mark W. Obershaw’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court rejected challenges to the admission of his statements, the admission of crime-scene and autopsy photographs, prosecutorial questioning and closing argument, and the jury instructions. The court also declined to exercise its authority under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E, to set aside or reduce the verdict.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the defendant's statements should have been suppressed because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda and Edwards.
- Whether the defendant's statements were obtained more than six hours after arrest in violation of Massachusetts' safe-harbor rule governing delayed arraignment questioning.
- Whether the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting more than eighty, and potentially nearly ninety, gruesome or duplicative photographs.
- Whether prejudicial prosecutorial questions during cross-examination required relief.
- Whether the prosecutor's closing argument contained unsupported inferences, improper personal opinions, or an appeal to jury sympathy and passion requiring a new trial.
- Whether the malice instruction permitting the jury to infer malice from intentional use of a dangerous weapon created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption or shifted the burden of proof.
- Whether the jury was required to unanimously agree on each Cunneen factor supporting a finding of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary power under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E to set aside the verdict or reduce the degree of guilt.
Holdings
- A defendant's question asking whether he could talk to a lawyer before leading police to the victim's body was equivocal and did not constitute an affirmative or unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. The defendant therefore validly waived his Miranda rights, and continued questioning did not violate Miranda or Edwards.
- The defendant's statements were not obtained in violation of the six-hour safe-harbor rule because the defendant was not arrested until 11:25 a.m., and the questioning did not extend beyond six hours after that arrest.
- The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting the crime-scene, landfill, and autopsy photographs because they had evidentiary value concerning the manner of the killing, the nature and extent of the injuries, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and consciousness of guilt, notwithstanding their gruesome or potentially duplicative nature.
- The prosecutor's challenged cross-examination questions and closing remarks did not warrant reversal. The unanswered questions placed nothing before the jury; the improper references in closing argument were either supported by the evidence, harmless, or did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- The instruction that the jury were permitted to infer malice from intentional use of a dangerous weapon was proper and did not create a mandatory presumption or shift the burden of proof.
- The jury were not required to unanimously agree on each Cunneen factor supporting a finding of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty because those factors are evidentiary considerations rather than elements of the crime or separate theories of culpability.
Key quotations
“For the rule of Miranda ... to apply, there must be either an expressed unwillingness to continue or an affirmative request for an attorney.” (800)
“If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.” (801)
“A six-hour safe harbor protection is only applicable once a defendant is arrested.” (801-802)
“The jury were told that they were “permitted to infer,” not that they must infer.” (809)
“Here, because it is evidence, not an element, that is involved, the Apprendi case is inapplicable.” (809-810)
Factual background
The defendant killed his brother by repeatedly striking him with a steel automobile steering-wheel locking device after conflict over the defendant's continued presence in his brother's townhouse. He attempted to conceal the crime by cleaning the apartment, transporting and burying the body, discarding the weapon and clothing, and disposing of other incriminating items. Police found him sleeping in his vehicle near a police station, and he initially agreed to remain and cooperate, later making incriminating statements and leading police to the buried body. At trial, he disputed the Commonwealth's account and claimed that his brother had initiated the confrontation and that he had struck him only once.
Procedural history
The defendant was convicted in the trial court of murder in the first degree. The trial judge also ruled on the defendant's motion to suppress and denied it, admitted extensive photographic evidence, overruled or limited objections to prosecutorial questioning and closing argument, and declined to give the requested unanimity instruction concerning the Cunneen factors. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its extraordinary power under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E.