Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and attempted aggravated rape. The court rejected challenges concerning juror note-taking during jury instructions, restricted courtroom access during the charge, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also found no basis for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge abused his discretion or violated the defendant's constitutional rights by permitting jurors to take notes during only the portion of the jury charge addressing substantive offense law and liability theories.
- Whether the trial judge failed to provide adequate cautionary instructions concerning the taking and use of juror notes.
- Whether restricting entry to and exit from the courtroom during the jury instructions violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.
- Whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the notetaking procedure, failing to seek preservation or inspection of juror notes, presenting an allegedly inadequate intoxication defense, making concessions in closing argument, failing to object to principal-liability instructions, failing to challenge the kidnapping indictment as duplicative, and failing to object to the kidnapping instruction.
- Whether the kidnapping conviction was duplicative of the attempted aggravated rape conviction.
- Whether the court should grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- A trial judge has discretion to permit jurors to take notes during only a particular portion of the jury charge, including the portion addressing the elements of the offenses and principal-joint venture liability. The judge did not abuse that discretion here.
- The trial judge's instructions concerning juror notetaking were adequate, and the judge did not err by failing to give additional requested or customary instructions.
- A trial judge may require persons who wish to attend jury instructions to enter before the charge begins and remain until it ends; such a restriction is not an unconstitutional closure of the courtroom and does not violate the Sixth Amendment public-trial right.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the notetaking procedure or seek inspection or preservation of juror notes.
- The defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's trial strategy, alleged failure to investigate intoxication, failure to present additional evidence, concessions in closing argument, or failure to object to the principal-liability instruction.
- The defendant's statement in a police report that he and Keegan had split four or five pitchers of beer was inadmissible hearsay, and the Commonwealth did not open the door to the statement by asking an officer about the defendant's demeanor.
- The court did not decide whether kidnapping could be a lesser included offense subsumed within attempted aggravated rape because, even assuming the defendant's theory, there was no prejudice: the jury found two other aggravating factors independently supporting the aggravated-rape conviction.
- The instruction that any restraint of a person's liberty constitutes confinement or imprisonment correctly stated Massachusetts law and was not erroneous.
- After reviewing the entire record, the court found no basis to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial under its statutory power of review.
Key quotations
“Notetaking is discretionary with the judge.” (833)
“It is not unreasonable, and certainly not unconstitutional, to require that one who wishes to hear jury instructions hear them in their entirety and not interrupt the judge’s charge by entering or leaving in the midst of it.” (836)
“The “basic trouble from the defense standpoint was weaknesses in the facts rather than any inadequacy of counsel.”” (837)
“If there was a weakness in the defense, it was not for want of accomplished lawyering, but for want of any promising defense.” (841)
Factual background
The evidence permitted the jury to find that the defendant and John Keegan followed the victim from a nightclub and a convenience store to her condominium. Witnesses saw the victim struggling with a man, Keegan kicking her, and another person dragging her into nearby woods, where police later found her severely beaten and dead. Physical and forensic evidence connected the defendant to the victim, including blood and DNA evidence, injuries, wet clothing, and a false explanation for the condition of his clothing. The defense claimed that Keegan was the principal actor and that the defendant was too intoxicated either to commit the crimes as a principal or to share the requisite intent as a joint venturer.
Procedural history
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, as well as kidnapping and attempted aggravated rape. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant appealed, asserting errors concerning juror notetaking, courtroom access during jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, rejected the claims, affirmed the convictions, affirmed the order denying a new trial, and declined to grant extraordinary relief.