Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant’s unexcused absence from a scheduled suppression hearing does not automatically waive the motion to suppress or authorize a judge to deem the motion itself waived. The judge may, however, determine that the defendant voluntarily waived the right to be present and proceed with the hearing in the defendant’s absence after making a reasonable inquiry into the circumstances. The court vacated the order waiving the suppression motion and remanded for a hearing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a defendant's unexcused failure to appear at a scheduled suppression hearing of which he had notice automatically waives the motion to suppress.
- Whether a judge has discretion to treat the defendant's unexcused absence as a waiver of the suppression motion.
- Whether a defendant's voluntary absence may waive the defendant's right to be present at the suppression hearing and permit the hearing to proceed in the defendant's absence.
- Whether the Superior Court judge properly treated Robinson's absence as an outright waiver of his suppression motion.
Holdings
- A defendant's unexcused absence from a scheduled suppression hearing does not automatically waive the motion to suppress.
- A judge does not have discretion to deem the defendant's unexcused absence an outright waiver of the suppression motion itself, although the court reserved judgment on whether waiver of the motion might ever result from other conduct.
- A defendant's voluntary absence from a scheduled suppression hearing may constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to be present, and the judge may proceed with the hearing in the defendant's absence.
- Before finding waiver, the judge must conduct a reasonable inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant's absence and determine whether the defendant had adequate notice and was voluntarily absent without cause.
- Waiver of the right to be present at a suppression hearing does not waive the defendant's separate right to the suppression hearing or the right to effective assistance of counsel at that hearing.
Key quotations
“there is no automatic waiver of the suppression motion in these circumstances.” (281)
“by his unexcused absence from the scheduled suppression hearing, the defendant may waive his right to be present at the hearing, but his absence does not waive the motion itself.” (281)
“If a defendant does not appear at a scheduled hearing on a motion to suppress, the judge should conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant’s absence is voluntary, making a reasonable inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s failure to appear.” (289)
Factual background
Brockton police went to a Holiday Inn to execute an arrest warrant for Tremmel S. Jackson, also known as David Simpson. After the defendant answered the door of a room rented to David Simpson, officers searched the room, escorted the defendant to an adjoining room, and questioned him; a detective found cocaine in a pair of pants in the first room. Robinson challenged the search and questioning, but failed to appear at the scheduled suppression hearing after several continuances.
Procedural history
After being indicted for trafficking in cocaine, Robinson filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and statements. He failed to appear at the scheduled suppression hearing, and the Superior Court judge found him in default and deemed the suppression motion waived. More than a year later, after his default was removed, Robinson moved to reinstate the suppression motion; the motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the suppression motion itself had not been waived and remanded for an order vacating the waiver and sending the matter to the Superior Court for a suppression hearing.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded to the single justice to enter an order vacating the Superior Court judge's order waiving the suppression motion and remanding the case to the Superior Court for a hearing on the motion.